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-Abstract
Globalization and automation are transforming the international labor mar-
ket. Although technological change has led to job polarization, rising income
inequality, and labor displacement, many overwhelmingly blame globaliza-
tion — immigration, trade, and offshoring — but not automation for eco-
nomic dislocation. Why do some people point the finger at immigrants and
workers abroad, but not robots? Which types of workers are more worried
about automation, and why?
A decade’s worth of survey data show that people have largely positive at-
titudes toward technology despite its disruptions to the labor market. Most
believe that technological innovations enhance our lives, make the world
better off, and should continue to be prioritized. Using a nationally repre-
sentative survey (chapter 2) and an online survey experiment (chapter 3) in
the United States, I show that people tend to cope with employment threats
from automation by displacing blame onto outgroups and demanding protec-
tionist policies. Many believe in the fallacy that labor demand is fixed and
workers compete in a zero-sum manner. With robots increasingly displacing
labor, people want to stop outgroups — immigrant and foreign workers —
from further dividing the pie. Hesitant to halt innovation, individuals opt to
buffer the technological threat to domestic workers with substitute policies
— immigration and trade restrictions — that they believe could improve na-
xi
tional wages and employment prospects. As such, automation anxiety may
have evoked individuals’ protectionist instincts, intensified attempts to resist
globalization, and contributed to the revival of radical politics.
But not all workers are equally anxious about robots and machines.
Chapter 4 leverages the household registration system in China to exam-
ine how institutions may lessen (or heighten) automation anxiety. This sys-
tem creates a stratified labor market that discriminates between local and
non-local workers. Drawing on data from semi-structured interviews, factory
visits, and two original surveys conducted in coastal China, I find that local
workers — who are better protected by local labor regulations — are more
worried about technological displacement than non-local workers. The di-
vergent legal-institutional environments faced by local and non-local workers
influence their expectations and the availability of exit options comparable
to their status quo. The undesirability of non-local workers’ circumstances
make their jobs less painful to lose and easier to substitute, leading to lower
technological anxiety. The greater legal protection afforded to local workers
makes them more expensive to hire, less competitive than non-local workers
with the same skills, and more anxious about automation. These results
suggest that opposition toward technology is more likely to originate from
workers in relatively privileged positions (e.g. unions) with few exit options
comparable to their status quo.
Overall, this work contributes to the nascent but growing literature in
political science on technological change, public opinion in international po-
litical economy, and labor politics.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
“The new technology was a necessary evil, those
plants that do not have technology today are in fear
of losing their plants altogether.”
— An autoworker in the United States, 1980s
“In Sweden, if you ask a union leader, ‘Are you
afraid of new technology?’ They will answer, ‘No,
I’m afraid of old technology.’”
— Ylva Johansson, Swedish minister for
employment and integration, 2017
1.1 Puzzles and themes
The impact of technology on workers is well documented. Economic historians charac-
terize the Industrial Revolution as deskilling where skilled artisans were substituted by
technology operated by semi- or unskilled labor (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982; Acemoglu,
1998). In contrast, the technological changes of today (1980s – present) are considered
to be skill-biased (Bekman, Bound and Machin, 1998), routine-biased (Jaimovich and
Siu, 2012; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014), and capital-biased (Blanchard, 1997) —
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privileging skilled over unskilled workers, non-routine over routine jobs, and capital over
labor. Machines can now reliably complete a wide range of tasks traditionally performed
by humans — self-driving cranes can stack containers at ports, compact three-wheeled
autonomous vehicles can deliver lunches and dinners, and robotic chefs can run fast food
kitchens entirely. Computerization and mechanization have had important implications
for employment and wages, contributing to increasing income inequality, labor displace-
ment, and job polarization (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007;
Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020). Looking into the future, researchers estimate that 9
percent (Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn, 2016) to 47 percent (Frey and Osborne, 2017) of
American jobs are at high risk of automation due to advances in robotics and artificial
intelligence.
Despite technology’s threat to workers, responses to automation appear to be differ-
ent from responses to other ostensible challenges to employment. Calls to slow technolog-
ical innovation are few and far between; innovation is encouraged and even incentivized
around the world. The Japanese government created a Robot Revolution Realization
Council to facilitate the development and use of autonomous machines (Kovacic, 2018);
the American Artificial Intelligence Initiative invests in the research and application
of artificial intelligence in industries (Executive Office of the President, 2019); and the
Chinese government provides subsidies to finance the production and adoption of indus-
trial robots (Cheng et al., 2019). This enthusiasm about the prospect of technological
change is largely shared by the public. A decade’s worth of cross-national surveys show
that a majority of people across the world believe that technology improves our lives,
makes the world better off, and should continue to be promoted (Inglehart et al., 2014;
Eurobarometer, 2017).
This enthusiasm for technology does not preclude growing concerns about workplace
automation, however. Workers who are more exposed to automation report lower levels
2
of job security (Patel et al., 2018). People are also fearful that new technologies will
eliminate more jobs than they will create (Eurobarometer, 2017; Pew Research Center,
2019c). How, then, do people cope with employment threats from a trend they sup-
port? How do they protect themselves — and their countrymen — from a technological
revolution that many consider desirable and perhaps inevitable?
The first part of the dissertation argues that, when confronted with automation
threat, people tend to divert their blame away from technology and toward outgroups.
They opt to demand actions against other sources of job threats that are ostensibly
created by outsiders — immigrant and foreign workers — but not technology. Many
believe that the amount of work is fixed and laborers compete in a zero-sum manner.2
With robots eating into the pie of jobs, people want to stop immigrant and foreign
labor from also taking a slice. Rather than halting innovation, which brings day-to-day
and long-term benefits, individuals seek to buffer domestic workers facing technological
threat with substitute policies — restrictions on immigration and trade — that they
believe could improve national wages and employment prospects. In parts of the world,
automation anxiety has intensified attempts to resist globalization.
What factors might help mitigate automation anxiety, and why? Existing research
uses educational attainment as a predictor of winners and losers of technological change
(Frey and Osborne, 2017; Gallego, Kurer and Scho¨ll, 2018). While education is no doubt
relevant to the analyses of mass attitudes, the second part of the dissertation addition-
ally shows how institutions — existing labor arrangements — can lead to different levels
of technological receptiveness for people who face similar threats of automation. Rules
governing labor relations and organizations affect workers’ expectations (as anchored by
their existing job, e.g. compensation and fringe benefits), the rules of termination (e.g.
at-will employment or termination for cause), and the availability of exit options com-
2Economists have written extensively about the lump of labor fallacy.
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parable to the workers’ status quo in case of dismissal. Workers are less likely to oppose
or resist technological improvements if laid-off workers can expect to secure satisfactory
replacements of their jobs within a short period of time, making labor separations less
distressing.
This dissertation explores these two themes in a set of three self-contained essays,
drawing on surveys, experimental data, in-depth interviews, and field work from the
United States and China. I outline each of these essays below.
1.2 Organization of the dissertation
Chapter 2: Misattributed Blame? Attitudes Toward Globalization in the Age of Automa-
tion
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation examine mass attitudes toward automation and
globalization among American workers. Globalization is neither the only nor the most
important source of labor market disruptions, but it has received outsized negative po-
litical attention. Using the 2016 American National Elections Studies (ANES), a nation-
ally representative survey, Chapter 2 finds that citizens have a tendency to misattribute
blame for economic dislocations toward immigrants and workers abroad, while discount-
ing the effects of technology. American workers facing higher risks of automation feel
less secure about their jobs. However, they are no more likely to oppose government
spending to promote technology that might aid further automation. Instead, they are
more likely to object to free trade agreements and favor immigration restrictions, even
controlling for standard explanations for these attitudes. While pocketbook concerns do
influence attitudes toward globalization, these findings call into question the standard
assumption that individuals understand and can correctly identify the sources of their
economic anxieties — rather people are prone to displace blame for economic stressors
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onto immigrant and foreign workers.
Chapter 3: “Restrict Foreigners, Not Robots”: Partisan Responses to Automation Threat
Building on the observational study in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 tests the theory of blame
misplacement directly by randomizing the cause of job losses and measuring individuals’
protectionist attitudes in an online survey experiment. I find that participants who were
primed with a news article highlighting unemployment due to automation reported more
protectionist policy preferences against foreign targets. Even with explicit information
that technology displaces jobs, people tend to take “their team’s position,” based on
their partisanship, in determining who or what they believe to be responsible for these
employment concerns. Specifically, direct cues about technological displacement make
Republicans more likely to demand tighter restrictions on immigration and Democrats
more likely to support higher tariffs. This study provides additional evidence that cit-
izens respond to automation anxiety by actively displacing blame onto and penalizing
groups that they already consider unwelcome or objectionable. Results from chapters 2
and 3 imply that automation anxiety may have increased globalization hostility in the
United States.
Chapter 4: Little to Lose: Exit Options and Technological Receptiveness in China
Chapter 4 takes an inductive approach and examines the structural and legal-institutional
conditions that may mitigate (or heighten) automation anxiety. It presents qualitative
and quantitative accounts of Chinese manufacturing workers’ reception of workplace au-
tomation based on semi-structured interviews, factory visits, and two original surveys
covering over 2,400 workers and 600 firms in 19 southern Chinese cities. It finds that
most manufacturing workers in the region — buffered by steady increases in demand
and chronic labor shortages — are generally unconcerned about technology’s impact on
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employment and wages at present. However, about half of the surveyed workers believe
that their jobs could be automated within the decade.
Paradoxically, insofar as laborers experience automation anxiety, local workers —
whom labor regulations better protect — are more worried about technological dis-
placement than non-local workers. The Chinese household registration system creates
a stratified labor market that discriminates between local and non-local workers. The
greater legal protections afforded to local workers makes them more expensive to hire,
less competitive than non-locals with the same levels of skills, and more anxious about
automation. On the other hand, this dualistic system lowers the expectations of non-
local workers — the undesirability of their circumstances makes their jobs less painful
to lose and easier to substitute. The availability of exit options no worse than their
status quo contributes to non-local workers’ lower anxiety about automation compared
to locals. The plethora of imminent threats to employment and their well-being that
non-local workers face also push technological displacement down their list of concerns.
These results imply that antagonism toward technology may be more likely to originate
from workers in relatively privileged positions with few exit options comparable to their
status quo.
1.3 Implications
This dissertation on the politics of automation has several implications for both schol-
ars and policymakers. Despite technology’s impact on workers, political scientists have
only recently started studying the political effects of automation. Thus far, evidence
is mixed as to how automation threat affects political preferences. Gallego, Kurer and
Scho¨ll (2018) argue that technology has created a large class of economic winners who
prefer traditional parties and are more likely to vote for the incumbent, thereby sta-
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bilizing politics in the United Kingdom. However, Frey, Berger and Chen (2018) and
Anelli, Colantone and Stanig (2019) show that automation exposure worsened actual or
perceived economic conditions, leading to increased electoral support for radical, anti-
status quo politicians in the United States and Western Europe. My observational and
experimental studies, which demonstrate a link between automation anxiety and protec-
tionist policy preferences, lend support to the latter. The public’s preference to respond
to technological threat by limiting other employment threats ostensibly created by out-
siders, as opposed to innovation, might have oiled the wheels of the populist backlash
against globalization and contributed to the revival of radical politics.
Through a review of surveys, in-depth interviews, and factory visits, this work also
offers a more nuanced view of workers’ attitudes toward technology. Macroeconomic
analyses often highlight the negative effects of technology on wages and employment,
but these are neither the only nor the most important considerations for most work-
ers. While workers feel the adverse labor market effects of technology gradually, its
perceived benefits (e.g. lowered risks of injury, less monotonous work, increased global
competitiveness) are often immediate, observable, and are considered necessary for firm
survival. Robots and machines are not merely threats to workers, but also allies. These
on-the-ground benefits of technological improvements play an important role in influ-
encing workers’ attitudes toward technology, but they are often overlooked in academic
and popular discourses on workplace automation.
Finally, this dissertation builds a foundation for cross-national studies of technolog-
ical receptiveness. The case of China shows that legal-institutional environments may
lead to different levels of technological receptiveness, even among people facing similar
levels of automation threat. Institutions of work affect what is at stake and the avail-
ability of exit options comparable to the workers’ status quo. Future research would do
well to consider how mechanisms creating stratification in other labor markets (e.g. core
7
and non-core employees in Japan, union and non-union workers in the United States)
affect technology attitudes. If technological improvements are considered necessary to
enhance economic growth and a nation’s competitiveness, it is critical to understand the
origins of technological anxiety and devise appropriate remedies for these apprehensions.
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Chapter 2
Misattributed Blame? Attitudes Towards Globalization in the
Age of Automation
2.1 Introduction
From the United States to Europe and beyond, populist leaders are enjoying a resurgence
propelled by widespread resentment toward globalization. The United Kingdom’s deci-
sion to withdraw from the European Union is widely viewed as a rejection of integration.
Marine Le Pen took National Front from the fringes of French politics to the forefront
by condemning immigration and criticizing international institutions. Globalization was
vehemently attacked by the left and right during the 2016 American presidential election.
Populists blame globalization — trade, immigration, and offshoring — for causing un-
deremployment, wage stagnation, growing inequality, and the disappearance of well-paid
factory jobs.
However, to explain these structural economic changes, the existing scholarship em-
phasizes the role of technology (Bekman, Bound and Machin, 1998; Acemoglu and Re-
strepo, 2018, 2020). Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find large and robust negative effects
of robots on employment and wages across commuting zones. Technological change is
also linked to job market polarization and increasing income inequality, hurting espe-
cially those in the middle of the education and earnings distribution (Goos and Manning,
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2007; Frey and Osborne, 2017). While automation had mostly threatened workers who
perform routine and repetitive tasks in the past, rapid developments in robotics and
artificial intelligence now threaten even non-routine jobs. Frey and Osborne (2017) es-
timates that 47 percent of American jobs are at high risks of automation. Even though
globalization has distributional effects, the literature overall shows that deepening global
integration does not explain the preponderance of affected workers’ plight (Helpman,
2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Ottaviano, Peri and Wright, 2013; Card, 1990; Peri
and Sparber, 2009).
Globalization, but not automation, dominates political discussions. This paper ar-
gues that automation threat intensifies efforts to restrict globalization. Individuals tend
to misattribute blame for economic dislocations toward outgroups — immigrants and
workers abroad — while discounting the effects of technology. Using the American Na-
tional Elections Studies, a nationally representative survey, I show that workers facing
higher risk of automation feel less secure about their jobs. However, workers at risk of
automation are no more likely to support government spending to promote technology
that might aid further automation. Instead, they are significantly more likely to oppose
free trade agreements and immigration, even when controlling for standard explanations
for these attitudes. These findings suggest that workers are misattributing blame for
harmful changes in labor markets toward immigrants and foreign workers, and away
from the technological changes which are primarily responsible for their weakening job
prospects.
This argument relates to two traditional approaches to the study of mass attitudes
toward globalization. The first posits that individual preferences should reflect economic
self-interest. In studying attitudes toward trade, analysts typically derive predictions
about individuals’ material interests based on the Ricardo-Viner or Stolper-Samuelson
model (Scheve, Slaughter and Slaughter, 2001). In doing so, they assume that citizens
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understand and can accurately identify the sources of their financial stressors or fortunes.
The second approach demonstrates that citizens are either disinterested or unable to en-
gage in such reasoning. These researchers instead emphasize non-economic influence on
preferences. Opponents of globalization are not necessarily economic losers. Economic
ignorance, ethnocentrism, political framing, and other symbolic attitudes, rather than
pocketbook concerns, determine attitudes toward globalization (Mansfield and Mutz,
2013; Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Rho and Tomz, 2017).
In this paper, I contend that grievances against globalization have economic origins
but economic losers often misattribute blame for their anxieties, and consequently, de-
mand policies that poorly advance their interests. While automation threat is associated
with lower levels of job security, citizens do not always make the correct inference about
the source of such anxiety. People tend to overestimate the extent of globalization (e.g.,
size of immigrant population) and underestimate personal risks of automation. They also
see foreigners and robots through different lenses. While many believe that technology
will raise the competitiveness of their firms and facilitate human progress, outgroups are
often viewed in zero-sum terms. Populist leaders tap into this sentiment by attributing
economic anxieties to the competition from immigrants and workers abroad. According
to theories of motivated reasoning, this vilification of foreigners is likely to be a par-
ticularly convincing narrative for those who are economically threatened as it validates
their preexisting beliefs about zero-sum competition with outgroups, leading to higher
rates of blame misattribution. Psychological research also demonstrates that blaming
outgroup helps individuals restore a sense of personal control.
This misattribution of blame may lead to poor policy outcomes. If trade and immi-
gration have key positive benefits for consumers and the overall growth of the economy,
responding to technological change with closed borders may harm constituencies that de-
rive key benefits from imported goods and immigrant communities. Protectionism may
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even hurt those who demand these policies in the first place if they are misidentifying the
source of their economic problems. In addition, the overwhelming focus on tariffs and
border controls as means to reduce inequality and prop up the middle class takes public
attention away from other pertinent issues such as job automation. Technology destroys
jobs, but it may also create new ones. It is important for individuals to be aware of
the challenges and opportunities related to technology, and to discuss how governments
may facilitate the development of skills that complement technological change and for-
mulate appropriate adjustment policies for displaced workers. Lastly, the misplacement
of hostility has had important political ramifications on the state of globalization. Pop-
ulist leaders in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere have found electoral
successes by framing globalization as the main cause of structural economic changes and
promising a retreat from the global market. The fracturing of international political
and economic unions and agreements are often economically detrimental and difficult to
reverse.
2.2 Structural changes in the American economy
There have been major transformations in the economy over the last thirty years. Since
1980, factory employment decreased by more than a third. Displaced factory workers
often have to settle for near-minimum-wage service sector work and they are, in many
cases, deprived of medical benefits and pension rights. Stagnant wages and growing
inequality are yet other sources of frustration and discontent. Real median household
income has stagnated for most people for about two decades, except for those at the
very top.
These secular trends — deindustrialization, job insecurity, wage stagnation, and
growing income inequality — coincided with immense increases in trade, offshoring, and
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immigration. The concurrence of these trends and and structural economic change has
led many to believe that reversing globalization will undo these changes. However, the
scholarship shows that trade only accounts for a minor share of layoffs and other labor
market shocks.3 A majority of Americans work in services and are largely immune to
pressures of import competition. The manufacturing sector, which experienced higher
incidences of trade-related layoffs, employs less than 10 percent of Americans. Although
recent work on the “China shock” shows the negative effects of Chinese imports on
employment and wages, scholars find that employment gains due to export expansion
roughly offset these losses.4 Overall, trade barriers may protect only a modest number
of workers while hurting many others: consumers, for example, enjoy sizable welfare
gains due to lower prices. Those in the export sector may also be harmed. The US is
the world’s second largest and largest exporter in goods and services respectively.
Populists also point the finger at immigrants for displacing native workers and de-
pressing their wages, but three decades of research in immigration economics provides
little support for their claims. Using a natural experiment, Card (1990)’s seminal work
shows that the sudden influx of Cuban migrants had virtually no effect on wages or
unemployment rates for low-skilled workers in Miami.5 Peri and Sparber (2009) further
argue that immigrants boost productivity and wages in the long run. Native workers
tend to transition into communication- and cognitive-intensive jobs as immigrants take
lower-skill and manual jobs. The fiscal effect of immigration is positive overall at the
federal level, meaning that immigrants contribute more in taxes than the benefits they
receive. Populists’ economic case against immigrants is largely unsupported by empirical
research.
3 Freeman (1995); Di Tella and Rodrik (2020).
4 Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013); Feenstra, Ma and Xu (2019).
5 Borjas (1995) reanalyzes the data and finds that there was a decrease in low-skill wages between
1979 and 1985. Peri and Yasenov (2018) find that Borjas arrived at his conclusions by selecting a very
narrow set of workers. He uses a small subsample of high school dropouts (fewer than 25).
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While protectionists have not gone so far as to advocate capital controls, they shame
multinational firms for moving production abroad and call for onshoring. Ottaviano,
Peri, and Wright (2013) argue that offshore workers are not a good substitute for native
workers as they specialize in different tasks. Offshoring leads to task-upgrading among
natives as offshore workers are often assigned tasks of lesser complexity. The study finds
that the decline in offshoring costs did not have any significant effect on employment for
native workers. In all, only a small number of workers lost their job due to offshoring.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), movement-of-work accounted for
just 3 percent of layoffs.6 It is also important to note that capital flows are a two-way
street, but the BLS does not collect data on the number of jobs created by foreign firms
in the United States.
Technological and Automation Threat
While globalization has created winners and losers, neither international trade, immi-
gration, nor offshoring explain the preponderance of the latter’s plight. Instead, the
literature on structural economic change emphasizes technology as a more important
source of economic disruption. Since the 1980s, a marked increase in labor productiv-
ity enabled real manufacturing output to almost double despite a 30 percent decrease
in manufacturing employment (Figure 1). Between 2000 and 2010, Hicks and Devaraj
(2015) estimate that over 85 percent of job losses in manufacturing were the result of
productivity increases due to the adoption of new technology, and only 13 percent were
lost to trade. Had the United States maintained its level of productivity in 2000, it
would require an extra 8.8 million more workers than it actually employed in 2010 to
produce the 2010-level output.
6Note that this figure may overstate the effect of offshoring as it includes both out-of-country and
domestic relocations. This figure was from 2012, the last year the statistic was reported.
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Figure 1: Manufacturing output and employment (1987-2018)
Note: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research Division.
Although manufacturing employment was at the forefront of issues during the 2016
presidential election, technology has played a far more important role in reshaping labor
market opportunities and outcomes than globalization, whether in the primary, manufac-
turing, or service sectors. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find large and robust negative
effects of robots on employment and wages across commuting zones. The introduction
of one new robot decreases employment by 5.6 workers, and an additional industrial
robot per thousand workers reduces wages by 0.5 percent. These labor market effects
most affected individuals with less than college education and workers in routine occupa-
tions. These findings are consistent with extant research on technological change which
shows that post-1980 mechanization has been skill-biased and routine-biased, privileg-
ing skilled over unskilled workers, and non-routine over routine jobs.7 Importantly and
perhaps surprisingly, technology has not produced offsetting employment gains in any
7Bekman, Bound and Machin (1998); Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020).
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occupation or education groups.8
Thus far, automation had most threatened workers who perform routine tasks as ma-
chines have comparative advantage over humans in performing tasks with well-defined
procedures and rules. Routine jobs can be cognitive or manual. Routine manual work
tends to be blue collar jobs, such as food batchmakers, machine tenders, and plant oper-
ators; whereas routine cognitive jobs generally require some level of precision, training,
or education, examples include bookkeepers and travel agents. These jobs tend to be
in the middle of the wage distribution.9 Automation has yet to pose widespread chal-
lenges to those in non-routine cognitive and manual jobs that occupy the opposite ends
of the skill- and wage- spectrum, although this is set to change. The former includes
well-paid managerial, professional, and technical workers, including doctors and soft-
ware programmers, whereas the latter are generally low-paying service sector jobs such
as cleaners, home care aides, and servers. Taken together, technological change has led
to the hollowing out of the middle and is linked to growing income inequality. Figure 2
shows the most and least automated jobs in the early 2010s as reported by occupational
experts and job incumbents.
Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics are putting more jobs at risk. Frey
and Osborne (2017) estimate that 47 percent of American jobs can be replaced by
machines due to these new developments. Different from the past, computerization is
no longer confined to routine tasks. Machine learning, including data mining, machine
vision, and neural networks allow even cognitive tasks to be automated. An occupation
which had not been computerized could face a high risk of automation in the future
as technology becomes more sophisticated and cheaper. Automation is conceivably
imminent in several occupations. Diagnostic programs now outperform dermatologists
8 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020).
9 Goos and Manning (2007).
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Figure 2: The most and least automated jobs
Note: Drawn from a survey sponsored by the Department of Labor. It asks a representative sample of
job incumbents or occupation experts the extent of automation of their jobs.
in identifying melanoma, the most dangerous kind of skin cancer. Robot journalists
write sports and finance articles at speeds much faster than the average reporter. The
Port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands has five fully-automated deep-sea terminals, where
longshoremen were replaced with self-driving cranes and carriers.
Technology may in the long-run create new jobs.10 However, workers displaced by
technology may not be qualified for the new jobs that are created. Many former workers
in routine occupations shifted into low-wage service jobs or dropped out of the labor
force altogether11 Oftentimes, they had to exit highly unionized sectors and settle for
precarious non-unionized jobs and were, in many cases, deprived of medical benefits and
pension rights. Laborers in demand in the future would tend to be those who are tech-
nically skilled or possess a comparative advantage over robots (e.g. good interpersonal
skills, creativity).
10The idea that any increase in the output of each worker reduces the number of jobs is called the
lump-of-labor fallacy. However, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find that technological change of late
has not created offsetting employment increases.
11 Autor and Dorn (2013).
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2.3 Blame misattribution: Scapegoating globalization
Although technology has disrupted workers’ livelihoods in the past and is poised to do
so at a faster pace and larger scale in the near future, globalization is disproportionately
blamed. Populist leaders and their supporters believe retreating from the global econ-
omy will address the negative changes in the labor market of the last few decades.
Politically-motivated Framing By Elites
The narrative that foreign imports and offshoring are killing American manufacturing
became the dominant frame to understand American job insecurity. Campaign adver-
tisements on trade had been predominately negative, emphasizing trade as a source of
unemployment.12 During the 2016 presidential election, major candidates from both the
left and right focused on the harmful labor market effects of import competition. Frames
alter opinion by changing how problems are understood — emphasizing certain values
and facts over others, giving them greater apparent relevance to the issue than they
would have under an alternative frame. Past research suggests that most Americans
have a poor grasp of economic trends, making them even more susceptible to framing
effects and misinformation. Only 26 percent of respondents know that manufacturing
output increased even as employment decreased.13 Americans also perceive the minority
population to be much larger than it is in reality.14
While globalization is at the forefront of issues during electoral campaigns, automa-
tion receives much less attention and is sometimes denied by politicians. In 2016, Clinton
was the only major candidate who acknowledged the challenge of automation, but the
issue was only mentioned six times on her campaign website of all speeches and ma-
12 Guisinger (2017).
13 Pew Research Center (2017b).
14 Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz (2005).
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terials she posted during the entire election cycle. Sanders mentioned it once and did
not consider it “a major driver of unemployment.” Automation was once brought up
on Trump’s site. The report written by two senior advisors plainly rejected the role of
automation in the decline of manufacturing.15
There are political motivations for elites to emphasize globalization over automation.
First, the nature of globalization renders it convenient for elites to use group cues, a po-
tent political tool. Outgroups, immigrants and workers abroad, who are seemingly mak-
ing considerable gains make clear and conceivable targets to blame. Political psychology
research shows that citizens are susceptible to manipulation, and group cues trigger the
emotion of anxiety independently of the actual threat posed by the outgroup.16 Anxiety
is known to cause behavioral changes that might be desired by politicians: anxious in-
dividuals are more likely to seek and retain information, engage in protective responses,
and vote. When people feel the need to compete for scarce resources, including jobs,
they are more prone to see outgroup relations in zero-sum terms.17 However, automation
does not fit as neatly in the “us-versus-them” narrative, and no prominent politician has
adopted such a frame so far.
Second, the lack of an “easy fix” makes automation an issue less ready for elites
to politicize. It is, for example, relatively straightforward for politicians to convince
citizens that a border wall and tighter visa restrictions will keep immigrants out, and
imposing high tariffs will stop the influx of cheap imports. Nationalistic and ethnocen-
tric sentiments also help justify the costs of such remedies. However, it requires much
more effort to persuade citizens that increased efficiency and productivity due to com-
puterization are undesirable and that impediments on innovation are suitable responses
15 The report titled, “Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, and Energy Policy
Impacts” was written by Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross.
16 Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008).
17 LeVine and Campbell (1972); Blumer (1958).
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to the “problem.”
Predilection for Technology and Downplaying of Technological Threat
Technology also makes for a poor target for attack because of the convenience it
brings. According to the World Values Survey, a majority of Americans believe that
science and technology make our lives easier and more comfortable (Table 1, Question
2). Few would trade a personal computer for a shared typist, the ATM machine for
visits to a teller, or automatic exchanges for manual telephone switchboards — not
even if the sacrifice would save an occupation. It is because most recognize that the
world moves forward because of advances in science and technology (Question 1), and
to retard innovation while the rest of the world promotes it would be unwise. A case
against technological improvement would be politically difficult to make as only 6.9
precent of the respondents agree that more emphasis on the development of technology
is bad (Question 3).
Table 1: Public attitudes toward technology (World Values Survey, United States, 2011)
Questions Responses
(1) The world is better off, or worse off, because of
science and technology
7.34 (mean), 8 (median)
(2) Science and technology are making our lives
healthier, easier, and more comfortable
7.19 (mean), 7 (median)
(3) Future changes: More emphasis on the dev-
elopment of technology is a bad thing.
6.9% Agree
Note: 1=Strongly Disagree; 10=Strongly Agree
The public’s familiarity with technology helps explain the stark difference in atti-
tudes toward machines during the Industrial Revolution and today. In recent history,
workers have shown positive attitudes toward technology in the workplace. In an in-
depth study of German workers, Thelen (1991) shows that labor unions and workers
were “fundamentally receptive to technological changes,” believing that firms’ failure to
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adapt new technology would make them lose their competitiveness and eventually force
them out of business. Milkman (1997) finds that technology vastly improved American
autoworkers’ work environments and they considered technology a “necessary evil” to
ensure their company’s survival. An Office of Technology Assessment of the United
States (1983) report states that “willing acceptance” of new technology was the most
common response of unions and their opposition to technology tended to disappear once
union leaders were convinced that their members would not be negatively affected or
would receive appropriate compensation if they were.
Not only do individuals welcome the benefits of technological change, they also have
a tendency to downplay its risks. Automation is not on the minds of most. Of the
3,650 responses to an open-ended question about the most important problem facing the
United States in the nationally representative 2016 American National Election Studies,
only three mentioned automation or technology. When directly prompted, two-thrids
of American respondents expect machines “to do much of the work currently done by
humans within fifty years.”18 However, four-fifths of them think that their jobs will
continue to exist in five decades. It is well documented in psychological research that
people are more optimistic about their own prospects than those of others. In a study,
college students believed that they were 50.2 percent more likely than their peers to
land a job after graduation and 44.3 percent more likely to own a home.19 Unrealistic
optimism or over-confidence is considered to be a defensive strategy motivated by a need
to reduce anxiety. It may also be a result of cognitive biases. Individuals have a bias in
recall — they are more likely to bring to mind personal actions, experiences, plans, and
attributes that make favorable outcomes more likely for them, but they do not give the
stereotypical person the same consideration.20
18 Pew Research Center (2016).
19 Weinstein (1980).
20 Tversky and Kahneman (1974); Weinstein (1980).
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Intense media attention and overestimation of the extent of globalization
While citizens downplay the risks of automation, journalists and the public tend to
overstate the extent and downsides of globalization. The media interprets information,
sets the agenda, and influences how issues are evaluated. Globalization is more heavily
covered and scrutinized harder than automation. The often visible nature of offshoring
— the image of a local plant shutting down and relocating its operations — as opposed to
automation which happens out of public view may have contributed to the discrepancy
in reporting.21
News coverage of globalization also tends to emphasize its various problems and
negative effects, such as employment concerns, factory closings, and safety and security
risks. Analyzing over 40 years of trade news, Guisinger (2017) finds that “bad news”
generate almost 40 percent more stories than “good news.” Like journalists, the public
responds much more strongly to negative than positive news, potentially leading respon-
sive governments to take overly aggressive measures.22 Due to limited media attention
until very recently, the extent to which technology affects workers is known mostly to
those who experienced it first hand. George Young, a former steel factory worker in
Gary, Indiana remarked, “We used to have 10 men doing cleanup in my job. Now one
man operates a machine. We used to have 10 men running the furnaces. Now robots
run them.”23 Technological change in manufacturing, in comparison to international
competition, is a trend that receives little media attention.
Expectations of Blame Assignment
21 Margalit (2011).
22 Soroka (2006).
23From March 28, 2017 edition of The Guardian, “White flight followed factory jobs out of Gary,
Indiana. Black people didn’t have a choice.”
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Taken together, we arrive at two main theoretical and empirical expectations. First,
a higher risk of automation is expected to lead to a more pronounced sense of job
insecurity (H1). Subjective assessments of job security do not require a high level of
sophistication or deep economic knowledge (Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). Second,
because of the much higher salience of globalization and the public’s predilection for
technology, I hypothesize that at-risk workers more likely to attribute their economic
anxieties to globalization rather than automation. Attributions of responsibility are
often subjectively motivated or biased, if not incorrect. In situations where multiple
parties may be responsible, people often focus on specific outgroups as targets of blame
to cope with negative circumstances and restore a sense of control. If this is the case,
automation threat will be associated with more hostile views toward immigration (H2),
trade (H3), and offshoring (H4), but has little influence on technology attitudes (H5)
(Allport, 1954; Glick, 2005; Bukowski et al., 2017).
Table 2: Hypothesized relationships between automation risk and preferences
Scenario 1
Blame misattribution
Scenario 2
Correct attribution
Scenario 3
Blame everything
Immigration control (H2) + / +
Trade barriers (H3) + / +
Discourage offshoring (H4) + / +
Cut technology spending (H5) / + +
If, however, workers facing higher risk of automation are found to have more negative
views toward technology and not globalization, it may instead be the case that workers
are attributing blame correctly (as in scenario 2). Alternatively, it is also possible that
at-risk workers may demand government action against all these threats to employment.
In this case, those who face higher job automation threat will hold hostile views towards
both globalization and technology (scenario 3). Table 2 summarizes these different
possible blame attribution scenarios, which we will test below.
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2.4 Research design
I use the 2016 American National Elections Studies (ANES) survey to examine these
different models of blame attribution. The ANES does not have a ready-to-use measure
of occupation that is detailed enough to allow the matching of meaningful estimates of
automation risks. I thus leverage individual responses to an open-ended question about
their occupations. Respondents are asked to describe “the kind of work [they] do” and
“[their] most important activities or duties at work.” Based on these descriptions, I
classified individuals into 840 detailed occupation categories using the 2010 Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. Responses of 3,936 individuals were coded,
and 3,775 and 3,532 of them could be linked to the two measures of job automation threat
respectively.24 For example, individuals who describe their jobs as “server, wait tables”
are coded as “waiters and waitresses (35-3031.00).” People who “take care of the elderly”
are classified as “personal care aides (39-9021.00).” In cases where respondents describe
duties that could fit multiple related occupations, I assign them multiple SOC codes. For
instance, individuals whose jobs are “special education teacher” are coded as “special
education teachers, preschool (25-2051.00),” “special education teachers, kindergarten
and elementary school (25-2052.00),” “special education teachers, middle school (25-
2053.00),” and “special education teachers, secondary school (25-2054.00).” Their risk
of job automation is the average of the estimate of each of these occupations.
There are two variables related to automation in the model. The first measures past
levels of automation. The data comes from a survey administered by O*NET, which
was sponsored by the Department of Labor. One of the questions asks a representative
sample of job incumbents and occupation experts how automated their jobs are. Each
SOC code has a corresponding subjectively assessed level of automation. It ranges from 0
24Among those who are not coded are individuals serving in the military or individuals who offered
ambiguous, intelligible, or no information.
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to 1, from not at all automated to fully automated. In the past, researchers had typically
used indicators that measure the prevalence of routine tasks in an occupation.25 This
self-reported data should provide a more accurate account of past levels of automation.
Jobs sometimes remain manual because initial costs are prohibitive, not because it is
technologically infeasible to automate. Job incumbents and experts are likely to have a
better sense of the extent of automation on the ground. An individual holding a job with
a high retrospective level of automation in our dataset means that he or she is working
in an area where sweeping automation has occurred, but he or she continues to hold
the job (e.g. to program machines). The important implication is that these individuals
are likely to have witnessed automation in their workplace, but are the survivors, if not
victors, of technological change.
The second and main independent variable is a prospective estimate of job automa-
tion risk. I adopt Frey and Osborne’s (2017) measure. This proxy indicates the risk
of automation for each occupation with the expectation that automation will become
more sophisticated and cheaper over the next decades, from 0 (not computerizable) to
1 (totally computerizable). The authors, together with a group of machine learning
researchers, determined whether 70 occupations are automatable or not based on the
detailed descriptions of tasks of occupations on O*NET, an online service developed for
the Department of Labor. A Gaussian process classifier was then used to estimate the
probability of computerization for other detailed occupations based on a training set
hand-labeled by the researchers. An occupation is deemed susceptible to computeriza-
tion if the tasks of the job can be sufficiently specified and performed by state of the art
computer-controlled equipment. They further consider the extent to which the automa-
tion of those tasks would require overcoming engineering bottlenecks such as perception
25The commonly used measure, routine task intensity (RTI) is only weakly correlated with actual
levels of job automation at r=.17. RTI is more strongly correlated with our measure of prospective job
automation risk, whether a job is susceptible to automation in the future, at r=.68
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and manipulation, creative intelligence, and social intelligence. For example, the job of
a fashion designer is less computerizable and under a much lower threat than a court
clerk because creativity is needed to perform the tasks of the former.
The retrospective and prospective indicators measure different dimensions and facets
of workplace automation. Figure 3 shows that the extent to which jobs had already com-
puterized and the likelihood of future automation are only very weakly correlated. Unlike
in the past, automation is no longer confined to routine, well-defined tasks. Computers
can now perform many tasks that were, not long ago, considered impossible to automate.
Levy and Murnane (2005) wrote that drivers are immune from job automation because
“it is hard to imagine discovering the set of rules that can replicate [a] driver’s behav-
ior.” Little did they know that autonomous driving would become an area of intense
engineering and machine learning focus. On the other hand, there are occupations that
had been heavily computer-assisted but are unlikely to be completely automated in the
near future, such as air traffic controllers and medical services managers.
Figure 3: Degree of past automation and future automation risk
Note: Retrospective and prospective measures of automation are only weakly correlated. The density
plots show the distribution of the observations.
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The outcomes of interest are directly drawn from the ANES.26 The dependent vari-
ables include feelings of job insecurity, attitudes toward free trade agreements, immigra-
tion, offshoring, and federal spending cuts on science and technology for individual i, in
occupation j, in industry k, living in congressional district l.
I regress individuals’ attitudes on trade, immigration, offshoring, and technology on
these measures of automation. In addition, I control for the offshorability of individual
i ’s job given their occupation j. I use Blinder and Krueger (2013)’s measure.27 An
occupation is deemed not offshorable if its tasks must be performed at specific location,
and require personal contact with end users. The measure ranges from 1 (not offshorable)
to 5 (offshoreable with minor or no difficulty or quality loss). I also hold constant the level
of immigration in i ’s congressional district l and import exposure in i ’s industry k. Level
of immigration is defined as the size of the foreign-born population in a congressional
district. Import penetration is operationalized as the total amount of imports over total
sales in the United States in an industry (three-digit NAICS).
Furthermore, the model includes other variables known to affect i ’s policy attitudes
and preferences — education, gender, age, family income, party identification, ethnocen-
trism, and nationalism. For ethnocentrism, I follow Kinder and Kam (2009)’s method of
estimation. It is defined as the average of the three out-group thermometers subtracted
from the in-group thermometer. Each respondent is in one of these four groups: Asians,
Blacks, Hispanics, or Whites. Ethnocentrism and nationalism are distinct concepts.
While ethnocentrism relates to how one evaluates their own ethnic group vis-a-vis other
groups, nationalism relates to one’s feeling toward their own country. Individuals who
are in the labor force, meaning those who are either employed or unemployed but looking
for work, are included in the sample. Those who are not are excluded because they are
26The specific questions used can be found in the Appendix.
27I followed his codebook to code the offshorability of occupations that were not coded. My additions
did not change the results.
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no longer directly exposed to automation risks.
The data has a multilevel structure with four levels of analysis. To avoid biasing
standard errors downward and producing spuriously “significant” effects, I adopt a mul-
tilevel ordered logistic model.28 The fully specified model is as follows:
Yijkl = α + β1Xijkl + γ1Zjkl + θ1Vkl + λ1Ql + τj + ζk + µl + ijkl
In this equation, Yijkl are the outcomes of interest. Xijkl is a vector of individual-
level covariates. Zjkl is a vector of occupational-level covariates. Vkl is a vector of the
industry-level covariate. Ql is a vector of the congressional district-level covariate. β1 is
the fixed effect parameter for individual-level covariates. γ1 is the fixed effect parameter
for occupational-level covariates. θ1 is the fixed effect parameter for the industry-level
covariate. λ1 is the fixed effect parameter for the congressional district-level covariate.
τj, ζk, µl are random intercepts. ijkl is the error term.
2.5 Results
Individuals who are more exposed to the threat of automation are more worried about
losing their jobs in the near future. Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities for
expressing concerns over job loss at different levels of prospective automation risk. This
finding echoes results from a recent study by Patel et al. (2018) that there is a positive,
statistically significant impact of automation risk on job insecurity at the county level.
The threat of automation is also, as hypothesized, linked to more intense hostility
toward globalization. Workers who are exposed to higher risks of automation are more
likely to prefer tighter immigration restrictions (models 1 and 2, Table 3) and oppose the
negotiation of free trade agreements (models 3 and 4). These results hold in all model
28I used ordered logistic regression for some subsample analyses where certain levels of data are
dropped. I specify those instances in the findings section.
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Table 3: Attitudes toward globalization (workers in labor force)
Reduce Immigration Oppose Trade Discourage Outsourcing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk of computerization 0.82∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.06 0.20
(0.20) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19)
Past level of automation 0.47 0.18 −1.34∗∗∗ −0.89∗ 0.83 0.24
(0.46) (0.43) (0.38) (0.43) (0.58) (0.58)
Offshorability 0.01 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Import Penetration −0.16 −0.26 −0.00
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23)
Foreign Born −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Gender (Male) −0.22∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.10
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
Party ID (GOP) 0.30∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Education −0.08∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Nationalism 0.26∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Ethnocentrism 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Family Income 0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var(Intercept[occ]) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.12) (0.11)
Var(Intercept[occ>ind]) 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Var(Intercept[occ>ind>cd]) 1.97 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.48
(1.66) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (1.63) (1.37)
Observations 2073 1811 2059 1801 2076 1814
Note: Results from multilevel ordered logistic regressions of globalization attitudes on hypothesized
determinants. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities at different levels of automation risk
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specifications, even with the addition of demographic and attitudinal controls. However,
the relationship between automation risk and attitudes toward offshoring (models 5 and
6) is not statistically significant, but is in the expected direction. It may be due to the
fact that there is little variation in the dependent variable. An overwhelming majority,
70 percent, of the respondents believe that the government should discourage companies
from hiring workers abroad. Only 4 percent think that the government should encourage
offshoring. This animus view toward offshoring is in line with findings in Mansfield and
Mutz (2013).
While automation threat is linked to anti-trade and anti-immigration sentiments, it
does not predict attitudes toward technology (Table 4). Although firms, rather than the
government, invest directly on automation, respondents’ views on federal spending on
science and engineering should give us a window to understand their general attitudes
toward technology. Without adding any control variables, future risk of automation is
associated with preference for federal STEM spending cuts, whereas higher past levels
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of automation are linked to support for higher STEM spending. However, the effects
disappear once we take into account individuals’ characteristics and their surrounding
environments. In models 8 and 9, there are no statistically significant relationships be-
tween the dependent and independent variables. In other words, individuals who face
higher risk of computerization are no more likely to oppose government spending on
science and engineering, fields where the very technology that displaces workers are de-
veloped. The lack of correlation between automation threat and preferences for federal
spending on technology suggests that individuals are either tolerant of the adverse la-
bor effects of technological change (in contrast to globalization) or they fail to make
the connection that government programs (such as, the American Artificial Intelligence
Initiative) may hurt some workers.
Figure 5 shows the average marginal effects plots of the main variables of inter-
est. Overall, the effects of various control variables are consistent with our conventional
understanding of their influences on globalization attitudes: education is negatively asso-
ciated with protectionist sentiments, nationalism and ethnocentrism strongly correlates
with immigrant hostility, and female respondents are more protectionist. Strong Re-
publicans are more likely to be anti-trade and anti-immigration than Democrats. While
these positions are inconsistent with those held by the party itself, they are consistent
with those held by the presidential candidate of their party in the election. Most im-
portantly, the confidence intervals of the effects of automation risk on immigration and
trade attitudes do not overlap with zero. These results are substantively significant
especially when we consider the context. The negative effects of job automation are un-
evenly distributed and will likely become stronger in the years to come. Automation’s
impact is expected to be geographically concentrated and will likely hit the industrial-
ized Midwest and several low-wage metropolitan areas the hardest. There is evidence
that robot exposure had swung the 2016 presidential election in favor of the more radical
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Table 4: Attitudes toward technology spending (workers in labor force)
Decrease government STEM spending
(7) (8) (9)
Risk of computerization 0.25∗ −0.10 −0.07
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17)
Past level of automation −0.80∗ −0.63 −0.39
(0.37) (0.42) (0.53)
Gender (Male) −0.46∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.13)
Party ID (GOP) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Age −0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.11∗∗∗ −0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Family Income −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Offshorability −0.05
(0.05)
Import Penetration −0.34
(0.30)
Foreign Born −0.02∗
(0.01)
Nationalism 0.06
(0.05)
Ethnocentrism 0.01∗
(0.00)
Var(Intercept[occ]) 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
Var(Intercept[occ>ind]) 0.06 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Var(Intercept[occ>ind>cd] 0.00 0.36 0.77
(0.00) (0.92) (1.21)
Observations 2421 2296 1814
Note: Results from multilevel ordered logistic regressions of attitudes toward technology spending on
hypothesized determinants. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Workers in the labor force includes those who are employed as well as those who are unemployed but
seeking jobs.
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Figure 5: Average marginal effects for key variables predicting attitudes
Risk of computerization
Past level of automation
% Foreign Born
Gender (Male)
Party ID (GOP)
Age
Education
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
-.5 0 .5
Average Marginal Effects - Fewer immigrants
Risk of computerization
Past level of automation
% Foreign Born
Gender (Male)
Party ID (GOP)
Age
Education
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Average Marginal Effects - Oppose trade
Risk of computerization
Past level of automation
% Foreign Born
Gender (Male)
Party ID (GOP)
Age
Education
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
-.4 -.2 0 .2
Average Marginal Effects - Discourage offshoring
Risk of computerization
Past level of automation
% Foreign Born
Gender (Male)
Party ID (GOP)
Age
Education
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
-.2 -.1 0 .1
Average Marginal Effects - Cut STEM spending
Note: Average marginal effects based on ordered logistic regressions of attitudes toward globalization
and technology on hypothesized determinants. This sample includes Americans in the labor force.
anti-status quo candidate (Frey, Berger and Chen, 2018). In addition, increasing anti-
globalization sentiments due to outgroup scapegoating may cause long-lasting damages
to the international system.
I present robustness checks in Tables 7 and 8 of the Appendix. Findings do not
change meaningfully with a different estimation method and weights. These findings to-
gether offer evidence for the blame misattribution model: workers facing higher risks of
automation feel less secure about their jobs. However, they are no more likely to oppose
government spending to promote technology that might accelerate further automation.
Instead, they are more likely to oppose trade agreements and favor immigration restric-
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tions, even after accounting for conventional explanations for these attitudes.
Further Discussion and Subgroup Analyses
There are other findings and potential challenges to the paper that merit further dis-
cussion. At the first glance, it may seem counterintuitive that automation exposure in
the past is not linked to immigration hostility (models 1-2, table 1) and is even associated
with more positive views toward free trade (models 3-4, table 1). It is worth highlighting
that workers in this analysis are still in the labor force and had most likely “survived”
automation.29 If computerization and mechanization are conducive to higher produc-
tivity and enhanced competitiveness, workers who are currently in more automated
occupations may have an edge in the international market, making them not merely the
survivors of technological change but also the winners of it. Among those who survived,
animosity toward economic outgroups is driven not by past levels of computerization,
but the prospective threat of automation.
Admittedly, the existing survey data limits our ability to trace and identify workers
who did not survive technological change. While the ANES is administered regularly, it
is not a panel survey. Given these constraints, I leverage information on respondents’
past occupations for a preliminary analysis of the relationship between past automation
and globalization attitudes among individuals who might have been displaced by tech-
nology. This analysis includes those who are no longer in the labor force or are currently
unemployed but seeking work. These individuals must have had at least a job in the past
to be included in the sample, as a job is the prerequisite for automation exposure. As
we do not know when these workers might have been displaced, certain time-dependent
covariates (e.g. import exposure at the time of displacement) have to be dropped. The
29The size of the coefficient is even larger if we exclude the group of workers who are unemployed
within the labor force.
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variable measuring prospective risk of automation is also moot. Results in table 5 show
that past levels of automation has a statistically significant effect on protectionist trade
and immigration policy preferences.30 This suggests that probable losers of technological
change are more opposed to globalization.
Table 5: Attitudes toward globalization and technology (potentially displaced individu-
als)
Oppose Trade Reduce Immigration Discourage Outsourcing Cut STEM funding
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Past level of automation 1.08∗ 1.39∗∗ −0.15 −0.36
(0.50) (0.52) (0.59) (0.56)
Foreign Born −3.03∗∗∗ −2.38∗∗∗ −0.90 −1.98∗∗
(0.64) (0.66) (0.74) (0.75)
Gender (Male) −0.20 −0.11 −0.23 −0.51∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Party ID (GOP) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nationalism 0.08 0.20∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ethnocentrism −0.05 2.82∗∗∗ −0.33 0.11
(0.35) (0.38) (0.40) (0.39)
Observations 987 995 993 998
Note: Results from ordered logistic regressions of globalization attitudes on hypothesized
determinants. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Respondents
included in this analysis are those who are unemployed but seeking work and those who are out of the
labor force but had at least a job in the past. I report additional results in Supplementary Materials
where I also exclude retirees.
However, there may be reasons for us to believe that automation and globalization
are related processes. If this is true, how do we know that losers of technological change
adopt more protectionist policy preferences as a result of blame misattribution, but
not because of a rational response to material losses due to globalization? While the
30Again, automation exposure has no statistically meaningful impact on views toward outsourcing,
possibly due to low variation in the dependent variable.
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Table 6: Attitudes toward globalization and tech spending (workers in non-tradable
sector)
Reduce Immigration Oppose Trade Discourage Outsourcing Cut STEM spending
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Risk of computerization 0.60∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 0.27 0.55∗∗ 0.15 −0.13
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18)
Past level of automation 0.57 0.21 −1.27∗∗ −0.95 0.50 0.30 −0.73 −0.56
(0.48) (0.52) (0.48) (0.52) (0.56) (0.62) (0.48) (0.57)
Import Penetration −0.03 −0.27 0.11 −0.28
(0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.37)
Foreign Born −1.43∗ −1.37∗ −1.77∗∗ −1.37∗
(0.58) (0.58) (0.65) (0.65)
Gender (Male) −0.20 −0.19 −0.05 −0.42∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
Party ID (GOP) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.01∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.05 −0.10∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nationalism 0.28∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Ethnocentrism 2.10∗∗∗ 0.38 −0.13 1.03∗∗
(0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.34)
Family Income 0.01 0.00 0.02 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1294 1124 1290 1119 1299 1127 1521 1126
Note: Results from ordered logistic regressions of globalization attitudes on hypothesized
determinants. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Respondents
included in this analysis are those who are working in non-tradable sectors as defined by Blinder and
Krueger (2013).
structure of the ANES limits identification options, I reanalyze the data with only a
subsample of Americans who worked in nontradable sectors (as defined in Blinder and
Krueger (2013)). Examples of non-tradable occupations are teachers, firefighters, and
restaurant servers. The intuition is that workers in non-tradable sectors are only min-
imally affected by import competition, and thus should have few economic reasons to
be against trade. They may even favor trade in their capacities as consumers. If we
observe stronger hostility toward trade among workers exposed to higher threats of au-
tomation in this subsample, there are stronger reasons for us to believe that outgroup
scapegoating may be at play.
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Figure 6: Average marginal effects for key variables predicting attitudes (full and non-
tradable subsample)
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Note: Average marginal effects based on ordered logistic regressions of attitudes toward globalization
and technology on hypothesized determinants. This main sample includes Americans in the labor
force, the nontradable subsample includes workers in the non-tradable sector as defined by Blinder
and Krueger (2013).
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Using the same ANES data, table 6 shows that workers in non-tradable sectors facing
higher threats of job automation are still more likely to support immigration restrictions,
oppose free trade agreements, and prefer the government to discourage offshoring. These
findings are robust and consistent across 5 out of 6 models, with and without controls.
Automation threat, as before, is not associated with anti-technology preferences here.
Figure 6 presents combined plots of average marginal effects for key variables predicting
attitudes for both the main sample comprising of all workers in the labor force and the
non-tradable subsample. The magnitudes of effect of automation risk on attitudes are
comparable or larger in the subsample than in the main sample. The consistent findings
offer additional evidence that hostility toward globalization is related to anxiety about
future job automation.
2.6 Conclusion
The existing scholarship on structural economic change emphasizes the impact of tech-
nology on wages and employment. Although immigration and trade only account for
a small percentage of layoffs, globalization takes the brunt of the blame for labor mar-
ket anxieties (Helpman, 2018; Card, 1990; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano, Peri and
Wright, 2013). While decades of studies in economics have documented the distribu-
tional consequences of technology related to employment, income, inequality, and health,
the political effects of automation are not well understood. This paper contributes to
the nascent literature by examining the impact of automation on public opinion on glob-
alization and technological change. Using a nationally representative survey, it shows
that automation threat intensifies globalization resistance. Workers who are threatened
by automation are prone to misdirecting blame for labor market threats toward immi-
grants and foreign workers and away from technological change. This misplacement of
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blame is due to politically-motivated framing by elites to reinforce ingroup and outgroup
differences, the visibility of globalization-induced job losses relative to technological dis-
placement, and the public’s predilection for technology.
To evaluate this claim empirically, I analyzed the American National Election Stud-
ies. I leveraged answers to an open-ended question about individuals’ occupations to
assess their automation risks. I found that workers facing higher risks of automation
feel less secure about their jobs. However, they are no more likely to oppose government
spending to promote science and technology that might accelerate further automation.
Instead, they are more likely to oppose free trade agreements and favor immigration re-
strictions, even after accounting for conventional explanations for these attitudes. These
results are robust and consistent across different models and model specifications. The
impact of automation threat on attitudes toward production offshoring, however, is not
statistically significant. It might be attributable to the low variation in opinion toward
offshoring, which is predominately adverse. A subsample analysis of individuals in non-
tradable sectors provides additional evidence of blame misattribution. Even for those
who are minimally affected by trade, automation threat is associated with protectionist
policy preferences. Overall, the evidence suggests that automation anxiety increases
attempts to resist globalization.
The theory of blame misattribution has important implications for debates over the
determinants of globalization attitudes. The premise in open economy politics (OEP)
that economic self-interest shapes individual preferences was once regarded as conven-
tional wisdom. Later research challenges the notion and suggests that non-economic
factors, such as ethnocentrism and racism, rather than pocketbook concerns, determine
preferences toward globalization. This paper shows that grievances against globaliza-
tion have economic origins, but it calls into question the standard assumption that
individuals understand and can correctly identify the sources of their economic anx-
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ieties. Anti-globalization attitudes are based on the beliefs, but not necessarily the
reality, that foreign outgroups are the sources of their economic anxieties. Given these
believes, demands for protectionist policies are motivated by self-interest regardless of
whether these policies actually address their economic concerns.
Correct blame attribution is important for three main reasons. First, the misplace-
ment of hostility towards globalization can lead to collective decisions that might be
economically detrimental and difficult to be reversed, such as the fracturing of interna-
tional political and economic unions (e.g. Brexit) and the election of political leaders
who have protectionist agendas and the executive power to reverse trade liberalization.
Second, the misattribution of blame may lead to poor policy outcomes. If free trade
and immigration are linked to overall welfare gains, responding to technological change
with protectionism may hurt constituencies that derive key benefits from globalization.
Protection may even hurt those who demand these policies in the first place if they
misidentified the source of their economic problems. Lastly, it is only through the un-
derstanding of the real challenge to work that citizens can better prepare themselves for
the advent of large-scale job automation. Knowledge of the threat of automation will
also motivate more informed discussions about appropriate adjustment and compensa-
tion measures for displaced labor.
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2.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Robustness checks
Table 7: Attitudes toward globalization (entire labor force), with weights
Reduce Immigration Oppose Trade Discourage Outsourcing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk of computerization 0.49∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.05 0.28
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19)
Past level of automation 0.58 0.22 −1.18∗ −0.91 0.32 −0.15
(0.39) (0.48) (0.47) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55)
Offshorability −0.00 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Import Penetration −0.11 −0.50∗∗ −0.03
(0.11) (0.16) (0.22)
Foreign Born −0.02∗∗ −0.01∗ −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Gender (Male) −0.16 −0.15 −0.01
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Party ID (GOP) 0.29∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.07∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nationalism 0.21∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Ethnocentrism 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Family Income 0.01 0.00 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2511 2232 2498 2222 2515 2235
Note: Results from ordered logistic regressions, with sample weights specified according to DeBell
(2010). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Attitudes toward tech spending (entire labor force), with weights
Decrease government STEM spending
(7) (8) (9)
Risk of computerization 0.28 −0.07 −0.06
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Past level of automation −0.79 −0.42 −0.36
(0.48) (0.51) (0.53)
Gender (Male) −0.37∗∗ −0.35∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Party ID (GOP) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.01 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.12∗∗∗ −0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Family Income −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Offshorability −0.05
(0.05)
Import Penetration −0.21
(0.21)
Foreign Born −0.01∗
(0.01)
Nationalism 0.02
(0.05)
Ethnocentrism 0.01∗∗
(0.00)
Observations 2517 2417 2235
Note: Results from ordered logistic regressions, with sample weights specified according to DeBell
(2010). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Attitudes toward globalization and technology (potentially displaced individu-
als, excluding retirees)
Oppose Trade Reduce Immigration Discourage Outsourcing Cut STEM funding
Past level of automation 1.08∗ 1.39∗∗ −0.15 −0.36
(0.50) (0.52) (0.59) (0.56)
Foreign Born −3.03∗∗∗ −2.38∗∗∗ −0.90 −1.98∗∗
(0.64) (0.66) (0.74) (0.75)
Gender (Male) −0.20 −0.11 −0.23 −0.51∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Party ID (GOP) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nationalism 0.08 0.20∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ethnocentrism −0.05 2.82∗∗∗ −0.33 0.11
(0.35) (0.38) (0.40) (0.39)
Observations 987 995 993 998
Note: Results from ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.7.2 Survey questions
These questions, drawn from the ANES, are used in the analyses:
1. Job insecurity: “How worried are you about losing your job in the near future?”
2. Trade: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. making free
trade agreements with other countries?”
3. Immigration: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who
are permitted to come to the United States to live should be [increased a lot,
increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot]?”
4. Offshoring: “Recently, some big American companies have been hiring workers in
foreign countries to replace workers in the U.S. Do you think the federal government
should discourage companies from doing this, encourage companies to do this, or
stay out of this matter?”
5. Federal spending cuts on science and technology: “Should federal spending on
science and technology be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?”
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Chapter 3
“Restrict Foreigners, Not Robots”: Partisan Responses to
Automation Threat
3.1 Introduction
Technological change has important implications for employment and wages, contribut-
ing to increasing income inequality, labor displacement, and job polarization (Autor,
Levy and Murnane, 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020).
While some believe that rises in output will increase labor demand for non-automated
jobs, others worry that new developments in robotics and machine learning will enable
capital to substitute for labor in an increasing range of tasks. Empirically, researchers
find that technological improvements after 1980 have been associated with declines in
labor share, unlike those in preceding decades (Autor and Salomons, 2018; Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2019, 2020). In light of continued technological advancements, nearly half
of American jobs are expected to be susceptible to automation in the coming decades
(Frey and Osborne, 2017).
Despite technology’s threat to American workers, responses to automation appear
to be different from responses to other apparent challenges to employment. Political
responses to automation, to the extent that they exist, are far less protectionist than
responses to import competition and immigration. Politicians concerned about automa-
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tion have focused primarily on advocating a safety net for affected workers, but not
stalling innovation or adoption. To counter economic shocks from automation, Demo-
cratic presidential primary candidate Andrew Yang proposed a universal basic income.
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez said that people should be “excited about
automation” as long as welfare policies are in place to reduce economic precariousness
and inequality. In fact, the American government actively pursues pro-technology poli-
cies. Tax codes in the United States are biased in favor of capital and against labor.
Effective labor tax rates are in the range of 25.5 to 33.5 percent, while effective capital
tax rates are only about 5 percent after the 2017 tax reforms (Acemoglu, Manera and
Restrepo, 2020).
The public’s overwhelming support for technology and innovation has helped stall
anti-technology campaigns and provided tacit support for pro-innovation programs across
multiple administrations. How then might workers cope with employment threats from
a trend they support? This paper argues that people tend to divert their blame and opt
to demand government actions against other sources of job threats ostensibly created by
outsiders. The role of these external factors often receives outsized attention in politi-
cal discourses. Although trade and immigration are responsible for only a small share
of labor market churn, their labor market effects are disproportionately emphasized by
politicians. Evidence shows that citizens cope with automation anxiety by penalizing
and clamoring for restrictions on groups that they already consider unwelcome or ob-
jectionable. With robots eating into the pie of jobs, people want to stop outsiders from
also having a slice of the pie.31 Partisan loyalty shapes who or what people designate as
the outgroup by influencing the type of information they consume and how they process
such information (Zaller, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006).
31Economists have written extensively on this phenomenon called the lump of labor or fixed pie
fallacy.
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I test this theory of blame displacement directly by randomizing the cause to be
blamed for job losses and measuring individuals’ protectionist attitudes in an online sur-
vey experiment. I find that participants who were primed with a news article highlight-
ing technological unemployment reported more protectionist policy preferences against
foreign targets. Specifically, cues about technological displacement made Republicans
more likely to demand tighter restrictions on immigration and Democrats more likely
to support higher tariffs. On the other hand, automation anxiety slightly dampened
enthusiasm for technology, but participants remained hesitant to support technological
restrictions. These findings imply that accelerated technological change may intensify
attempts to resist globalization, but not necessarily automation (at least not yet).
Political scientists have only recently started studying the political effects of au-
tomation. This paper contributes to this nascent but growing body of work in political
economy. Thus far, evidence is mixed as to whether and how automation threat shapes
political preferences. Thewissen and Rueda (2019) and Jeffrey (2019) show that au-
tomation threat increases support for redistributive policies in Europe. However, Zhang
(2019) finds that raising awareness about automation has no impact on preferences
across a wide host of policies. Frey, Berger and Chen (2018) and Anelli, Colantone
and Stanig (2019) argue that automation increased electoral support for radical, anti-
status quo platforms in the United States and Western Europe. Contributing to these
discussions, this paper establishes and highlights the link between automation anxiety
and protectionist policy preferences, which may have oiled the wheels of the populist
backlash against globalization and contributed to the revival of radical politics.
This paper also relates to the discussion on why individuals’ policy preferences de-
viate from their economic interests. Opposition to trade and immigration does not nec-
essarily originate from material losses from the same sources. Researchers have chalked
this discrepancy up to economic ignorance and political framing, among other factors
47
(Mansfield and Mutz, 2013; Naoi and Kume, 2015; Rho and Tomz, 2017). This exper-
imental study shows that even in the presence of information that neither trade nor
immigration (but technology) was responsible for a specific case of layoffs, participants
still clamored for protection. This is consistent with expectations derived from psy-
chological research that picking on an enemy improves feelings of internal agency and
personal control (Weiner, 1985; Bukowski et al., 2017). Both of which can be comforting
sentiments in the face of a technological revolution that many consider inevitable.
But is it really inevitable? On one hand, this study shows that technology is not
immune to opposition. On the other, it finds that support for technology remained high
even when participants were directly reminded of technology’s negative effects on em-
ployment. Historically, when labor-replacing technology threatened jobs, resistance was
the norm rather than the exception (Frey, 2019). If continued technological innovation
is conducive to long-term economic growth and enhanced human welfare, it is perhaps
reassuring that the increasing pace of technological change of late has not inspired a new
wave of Luddism. But, in the long run we are all dead.32 The long-run reward of pros-
perity may not be sufficient to support an enduring coalition for automation. Although
technology is enjoying its heydays, it will be a fruitful endeavor for future research to
examine the conditions in which the public’s enthusiasm toward technology might break
down. The experiment suggests that such opposition may more likely originate from the
left.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: the next section reviews a decade’s worth
of public opinion data in the United States on mass attitudes toward technology, which
shows that enthusiasm for, and concerns about, workplace automation coexist. The
third section lays out the theory of blame misplacement and corresponding expectations
regarding people’s responses to automation threat. The fourth and fifth detail the
32To quote John Maynard Keynes.
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design and results of the online survey experiment conducted in 2018. The final section
concludes.
3.2 Public opinion on workplace technology
A review of public opinion surveys from the last 10 years finds that Americans are
consistent supporters of technology and innovation (shown in Table 10). A majority
believe that technology makes life easier, is beneficial to the economy, and will overall
create more opportunities for the next generation. Over 90 percent of Americans be-
lieve that investments in science and technology are crucial to maintaining American
competitiveness in the world.
Table 10: Public opinion on general purpose technology
Survey / Polling
Organization (Year)
Questions Results
World Values Survey
(2010)
Because of science and technology, there will
be more opportunities for the next generation
(1/completely disagree – 10/completely agree)
7.25 (Mean)
World Values Survey
(2010)
Science and technology are making our lives
healthier, easier, and more comfortable.
(1/completely disagree – 10/completely agree)
7.19 (Mean)
Chicago Council Survey
(2015)
Please indicate how important the following
factors are to the United States remaining
competitive with other countries in the
global economy: Investing in science and
technology
58% Very important
33% Somewhat important
5% Not very important
3% Not at all important
American National
Election Studies
(2016)
Should federal spending on science and
technology be increased, decreased, or
kept the same?
57% Increased
35% About the same
8% Decreased
Gallup Organization
(2018)
Overall, do you think that science and
technology will help improve life for the
next generation?
91% Yes
7% No
2% Don’t know
John J. Heldrich
Center for Workforce
Development at
Rutgers (2018)
New technologies are good for the economy.
44% Agree a lot
49% Agree a little
5% Disagree a lot
2% Disagree a lot
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Figure 7: Overall positive appraisal of workplace technology
Data from a PEW conducted in May 2017. Respondents were asked if technology has (1) made their
work more or less demanding, (2) more or less interesting, and (3) increased or decreased opportunities
for career advancement. Results are weighted. Respondents include Americans who are currently
employed on a full- or part-time basis.
More recent and topical surveys reveal that Americans’ positive appraisal of technol-
ogy largely extends to machines, equipment, and software that are used in the workplace
as well — even though these technologies could potentially replace human workers. Tech-
nology sometimes changes the job itself. According to a Pew Research Center survey
conducted in 2017, about half of the respondents think that technology has made their
jobs more interesting and has created more opportunities (Figure 7). In contrast, just
above 10 percent believe technology made their jobs more mundane and diminished op-
portunities. However, slightly more people report that technology made their jobs more
demanding rather than less demanding.33
33For example, accelerated technological change necessitates continuous learning and training for
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To some extent, workers differentiate between different types of machines. They
rate labor-augmenting and labor-displacing technologies differently. Labor-augmenting
technologies increase the efficiency and productivity of workers, and labor-displacing
technologies diminish the set of activities in which labor adds significant value. Fig-
ure 8 shows that a majority of workers have favorable views on the former (such as
word processor, email, and smartphones), but they are slightly more ambivalent toward
technologies that can effectively substitute for labor (such as industrial robots and self-
service technologies). That being said, less than 15 percent of them deem the impact of
the latter category of labor-saving technologies to be strictly negative.
Figure 8: Opinion on various workplace technology
Data from a PEW conducted in May 2017. Results are weighted. Respondents include Americans who
are currently employed on a full- or part-time basis.
However, working Americans’ enthusiasm toward technology dampens when they
are asked to consider technology’s effect on jobs, especially in the long-run. While only
9 percent of respondents report working in companies that had lost employees due to
knowledge workers thereby increasing effort, but machines like automated guided vehicles (AGVs)
likely would have decreased the physicality of jobs for others.
51
technological change, about 56% of Americans believe that new technologies overall elim-
inate more jobs than they create (John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development
at Rutgers University, 2018).34 American’s projections of technology’s future impact on
jobs is even grimmer. Another survey finds that 78 percent of Americans find the future
scenario in which robots and computers do most of the jobs that are currently done
by humans to be at least somewhat realistic (Pew Research Center, 2017a). About 7
in 10 believe that robots and artificial intelligence will steal people’s jobs. Nearly half
say workers will have less job security by 2050 (Pew Research Center, 2019c). In sum,
American workers have a clear affinity for technology, but at the same time, they are
deeply concerned about the its employment implications.
3.3 Automation threat and partisan interpretation
Job loss is often a traumatic event and people’s sensitivity to unemployment is well-
documented. Concerns about labor displacement affect individuals’ physical and psy-
chological well-being (McKee-Ryan et al., 2005), preferences for welfare policies (Iversen
and Soskice, 2001), willingness to vote (Burden and Wichowsky, 2014), and vote choice
(Conover, Feldman and Knight, 1986). Politicians also campaign heavily on employment
promotion and often make costly decisions to signal their commitment to job creation
to claim political credit (Jensen and Malesky, 2018).
The United States is an innovation-friendly nation from its grassroots to its elites,
in spite of technology’s disruptions to the labor market. Since the 1980s, technologi-
cal change has contributed to increasing income inequality, job polarization, and labor
displacement (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007). Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2020) find that the adoption of one more industrial robot in a commuting
34Higher educational attainment is correlated to a more pessimistic assessment of technology’s current
impact on jobs.
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zone reduces employment by about six workers. Looking into the future, researchers
estimate that 9 percent (Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn, 2016) to 47 percent (Frey and Os-
borne, 2017) of American jobs are at high risk of automation due to advances in robotics
and artificial intelligence. Notwithstanding the significant difference between these esti-
mates, neither projection bodes well for millions of workers. It is no surprise that most
Americans, as discussed before, expressed concerns about technological displacement
when directly asked about it (Pew Research Center, 2017b, 2019c).
“Restrict foreigners, not robots?”
How do people then cope with employment threats from technological change — a
trend that they generally support? People tend to displace blame and opt to demand
government actions against other sources of job threats that are ostensibly created by
outsiders. Psychological research finds that threats increase scapegoating (Rothschild
et al., 2012; Bukowski et al., 2017). People frequently use outgroups as scapegoats when
they believe that members of the outgroup are capable of causing the negative outcome
in question (Sullivan, Landau and Rothschild, 2010; Glick, 2005). Whilst economic
phenomena and crises are often complex with multiple causes, emphasizing one or a few
external, controllable, and specific sources or actors as explanations of negative outcomes
helps preserve feelings of internal agency and personal control (Weiner, 1985; Bukowski
et al., 2017). These sentiments may be particularly reassuring in the face of a trend
that seems inevitable. Hesitant to halt innovation, individuals rather buffer domestic
workers facing technological threat with substitute policies — restrictions on immigrants
and foreign workers — that they believe could improve national wages and employment
prospects. Thus, employment threats from technological change may increase demands
for restrictions on these outgroups.
Partisanship likely shapes who or what people specifically believe to be culpable for
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their job insecurity, in other words, who or what gets designated as the outgroup. Party
identity tends to be very stable. Partisanship develops at a young age and it rarely
changes over the life cycle (Sears, 1975). In American politics, this salient and powerful
identity influences attitudes, preferences, and behavior, including trust in government,
economic evaluations, feelings about the fairness of elections, and church attendance
(Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014; Lenz, 2013). Even presumptively fundamental
beliefs, like religiosity, may change to align with party loyalty (Margolis, 2018).
Partisanship’s influence can be seen in a few ways here. It affects the information
people choose to receive and how they process such information. Some seek co-partisan
media sources that they deem them more credible and trustworthy (Zaller, 1992), while
others use selective information to reduce cognitive dissonance by affirming beliefs they
feel uncertain about (Taber and Lodge, 2006). The Internet and cable news facilitate
partisans’ ability to obtain news and commentaries consistent with their leanings. The
prevalence of social media platforms also exposes individuals to belief-consistent infor-
mation, even when they are not actively seeking out news (Sunstein, 2018). In addition
to partisan differences in information exposure, party identity also encourages biased
interpretations of events and issues. Even if people begin with very similar sets of facts,
they are motivated to arrive at conclusions that are consistent with their partisanship.
Interpretations also provide opportunities for partisans to rationalize their opinions as
real-world conditions change (Gaines et al., 2007).
Before we dive into a possible partisan divergence in responses to automation, it
is worthwhile to note that there is no meaningful difference across partisanship in the
perception or assessment of automation threat. Figure 9 shows that roughly equal
proportions of Democrats and Republicans are worried about technology doing most
of the work currently done by human workers. Despite this common assessment of
threat, partisans are likely to blame different actors for the increased employment risks.
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Figure 9: Concerns over technological displacement, by party
Data from Pew Research Center (2017b), Weighted.
For decades, immigrants and foreign workers from lower-wage countries are among the
most hotly disputed outgroups in the United States. Taking “the team’s position,”
self-identified Republicans may be more likely to favor restrictions on immigrants, while
self-identified Democrat may prefer limits on imports in response to automation threat
to protect American jobs. Although members of neither party have ever been unanimous
on immigration and trade, past studies show that both parties have clear and dominant
positions on both issues (Karol, 2000; Jeong et al., 2011; Levy, Wright and Citrin, 2016).
Partisan differences on trade and immigration
There is a rather visible partisan divide on immigration issues. Analyzing 24,208 votes
in the House and 6,985 votes in the Senate on the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act, Wong (2017) finds that Republican representatives are
3.7 and 1.6 times more likely than Democratic representatives to support restrictive
immigration-related legislature in the House and Senate respectively. The likelihood
that Republican House representatives vote yea on final passage votes on restrictive
immigration-related legislation is approximately 96 percent, while that for Democratic
representatives is about 23 percent (Ibid). This difference can be seen across multi-
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ple dimensions of immigration reform, including admissions, border security, interior
immigration enforcement, and integration policies.
There are degrees of factional infighting over immigration issues, but the voting
records ultimately demonstrate that the socially conservative Republicans triumphed
over the pro-business wing. While the pro-business faction of the Republican party
prefer laxer immigration policies to keep labor supply available and cheap, the socially
conservative Republican wing worries that immigration would weaken the traditional
culture that they prize. On the whole, Republican politicians were more likely to vote
against business interests on immigration. Amongst Democratic politicians, the ethnic
and civil rights faction has the upper hand. They tend to emphasize the humanitarian
and social merits of immigration, preferring more permissive policies to facilitate family
reunions and safeguard civil rights. The pro-labor wing of the party has softened their
stance on immigration policies over time, increasingly viewing immigrant workers “as
a target of opportunity rather than an inevitable threat” (Jeong et al., 2001, p 524).
Public opinion maps closely onto elite positions. Self-identified Republicans were con-
sistently more opposed to immigration than self-identified Democrats between 1992 and
2016 (American National Election Studies, 2017). For over a decade, more Republicans
have believed immigrants burden the country by taking jobs and welfare rather than
strengthen it with their hard work and talents, and the reverse is true for Democrats
(Pew Research Center, 2019b).
While the Democrats are pro-immigration, they are more conservative when it comes
to trade. The Democratic party, representing the interests of export-oriented agricul-
tural constituents in the south, was once the free-trade party for much of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries (Irwin, 2017). The Republican party, on the other hand, used
to champion high tariffs to protect industrial interests in the northeast. However, by the
1970s, the parties realigned on trade policy. Republicans embraced free trade to cater to
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the increasingly export-oriented business interests, and Democrats have discarded their
long-standing liberal stance on trade to win support from newly protectionist unions.
Democrats are also closely tied to progressive interests, such as human rights and envi-
ronmental movements, which have long expressed reservations about trade’s impact; as
well as groups in support of economic justice and reducing inequality. Some Democratic
politicians (e.g. Senator Bernie Sanders and Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib) tie trade
issues to corporate greed, pitting labor interests against business elites, and argue that
trade liberalization has allowed multinational companies to hire workers abroad who are
willing to work for low wages, to the detriment of American workers.
A bivariate model coding Democrats before 1970 and Republicans since 1970 as
the “free-trade party” predicted more than 72 percent of congressional votes on the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other trade-related bills correctly
(Karol, 2000). Both Bush and Clinton relied on the support of Republicans. Under
Obama, 90 percent of House Republicans supported a free trade agreement with Colom-
bia, while 85 percent of House Democrats voted against it (Irwin, 2020). More recently,
Trump’s protectionist policies signified a sharp departure from the pro-trade position of
the Republican party. Neither party’s presidential candidate supported the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) in 2016. That said, pro-trade capital interests continue to influence
the Republican leadership (while labor unions have the ear of the Democratic leader-
ship). At the grassroots, self-identified Democrats were more opposed to free trade than
self-identified Republicans in all but one election-year survey conducted by the American
National Election Studies between 1988 and 2016 (American National Election Studies,
2017).
Immigrant workers and foreign workers who are willing to accept low wages are
“viable scapegoats” (Glick, 2005). When confronted with employment threats from au-
tomation, people may opt to instead demand restrictions on other sources of job threats
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that are ostensibly created by groups they already find undesirable or objectionable.
Although the academic community casts doubts on the effectiveness of rolling back
globalization in saving jobs, many party elites and their supporters believe immigrants
and foreign workers compete with American workers in a zero-sum manner. In view of
the the current partisan divide, we may expect the threat of technological displacement
to increase support for immigration restrictions among self-identified Republicans and
trade restrictions among self-identified Democrats.
While partisan identity has found to be a strong predictor of economic and political
behaviors, several factors could moderate the effect. Blame displacement away from
automation and toward outgroups is plausibly less likely among a few groups of people.
Previous work finds that education and job security are linked to more liberal attitudes
toward trade and immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Pardos-Prado and Xena,
2019). Therefore, we might expect that individuals with higher levels of educational
attainment and higher confidence in their labor prospects will be less prone to outgroup
scapegoating. In addition, those who have preexisting negative opinions toward work-
place automation might also be less likely to transfer blame from technology to another
source.
Attitudes toward technology
How might technological unemployment affect attitudes toward technology? The ex-
isting literature does not provide a lot of guidance on whether continued technological
improvements would give rise to a new wave of Luddism today. Historically, when labor-
displacing technology threatened the jobs and livelihoods of workers, resistance was the
norm rather than the exception (Frey, 2019). However, researchers have also found
support for modern technology amongst workers, including manufacturing workers who
have been among the most affected by automation (Thelen, 1991; Milkman, 1997). In-
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dustrial robots and machines are not merely a threat to jobs, but an integral part of
work today. Furthermore, technology is much more widespread — and possibly better
liked — currently than centuries ago. Considering the public’s penchant for modern
technology, as expressed in public opinion surveys, and the absence of anti-technology
rhetoric from political elites, automation threat may not necessarily increase hostility
toward technology. Zhang (2019) finds that raising awareness of technology’s impact on
jobs has no effect on preferences for government restrictions on automation.
Having said that, automation may not be immune to opposition across all of society.
Automation threat may increase demands for technology restrictions among individu-
als who prize labor welfare and employment above unhindered innovation. Those who
believe that technological change will only enrich large corporations or other economic
elites and leave the masses behind may also be against uncontrolled automation. Some
Democratic party figures (e.g. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez) have already
expressed this sentiment, emphasizing that enthusiasm for automation is contingent
upon widening and deepening the safety net for workers. Given Democrats’ dissatis-
faction with the existing American welfare system, automation anxiety may increase
support for limiting technology among self-identified Democrats.
To summarize, automation anxiety may have no impact on support for technological
restrictions but may increase protectionist demands against foreign targets. In response
to automation threat, Republicans are more likely to favor stronger limitations on im-
migrants and Democrats additional restrictions on imports produced by foreign labor.
These effects could be moderated by standard explanations for globalization attitudes,
such as education and job security.
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3.4 Research design
Survey experiment
In assessing the political impact of automation threat, it is empirically challenging to
isolate the unique effects of technology from other sources of employment threats with
observational data. Although roughly 75 percent of American jobs are not offshorable
(Blinder and Krueger, 2013), a nontrivial number of workers face challenges from both
trade and automation simultaneously. Among the latter, some processes of technological
change and globalization are interrelated (Baldwin, 2019).
Therefore, to examine the causal relationship between automation anxiety and policy
preferences, I conducted to a survey experiment with a vignette design to manipulate
respondents’ sources of job anxiety. I test the theory of blame displacement directly
by randomizing the cause to be blamed for job losses and measuring individuals’ sub-
sequent protectionist attitudes. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) and TurkPrime in August 2018. While this sample is not representative
of the American population, the experiment provides a useful test of the theory’s inter-
nal validity. In addition, replication exercises show that surveys conducted via MTurk
produce very comparable findings as surveys on nationally representative samples (Huff
and Tingley, 2015; Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012).35 Respondents had to be located
in the United States, at least 18 years of age, and in the labor force (employed or unem-
ployed but seeking work) to participate in the survey. Measures were in place to ensure
data quality (e.g. CAPTCHA to thwart spam and bots, location screening to block
participation from outside of the United States, attention checks, manipulation checks,
and survey timekeeping). The study was registered with Evidence in Governance and
Politics (EGAP).36
35The design’s implications on external validity will be further discussed in the results section.
36A discussion of the change in organization of this paper in relation to the preregistration document
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The survey was roughly divided into four parts. The first part consisted of questions
about the respondents’ employment status, party identification, level of nationalism and
ethnocentrism, and other key demographic information. These questions were placed
at the onset of the survey instrument to avoid conditioning on post-treatment variables
(Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres, 2018). To proceed to the experimental portion of the
survey, respondents were required to pass an attention check. The system then screened
out those who failed the pre-treatment attention check. Pre-treatment attention checks,
as opposed to those administered after random assignment, allows the pruning of subjects
in a way that prevents biases that result from differential attrition across treatment arms.
While this screening changes the inferential target to a subpopulation of subjects who are
paying sufficient attention to pass the attention check, it has the important advantage
of not compromising internal validity of the study (Aronow, Baron and Pinson, 2018).
The experimental part of the survey manipulates the sources of job anxieties. Re-
spondents are randomly assigned a fictitious news article about a made up company. In
each of the treatment conditions, Aiden Toy announces its plan to permanently close
down a number of its factories due to a different reason — (1) automation, (2) offshoring
to China, (3) offshoring to Canada, (4) competition with cheap imports, (5) hiring of
more immigrants in remaining plants, and (6) no specified reason. The automation
treatment is shown below as an example. Only the heading and the underlined sentence
are varied for most cases except for the control, where respondents read a (7) “Company
Spotlight” article about Aiden Toys, with the informational details preserved from the
treatment conditions. Below are text examples or excerpts (Table 11) of the experimen-
tal conditions.
can be found in the Appendix.
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Automation threat treatment:
Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 US jobs due to automation
<Photo of factory>
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10 facto-
ries in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are located
in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s 10,000
workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company will be able to produce
the same amount of toys despite the closures, a spokesperson said in a statement.
Twenty-five new fully automated lines have been installed in its five remaining plants.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not
specify its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s
internal projections.
Control:
Company Spotlight: Aiden Toys Inc
<Photo of factory>
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc operates 10 factories in the
United States. They are located in Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. It cur-
rently employs about 10,000 workers. The company is expected to produce the same
amount of toys in the next financial year, the spokesperson said in a statement.
Aiden Toys reported that sales rose by a modest 0.7 percent last year. It did not
specify its revenue, saying only that it is consistent with the company’s internal pro-
jections.
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All experimental conditions:
Table 11: Experimental conditions (excerpts)
Treatment Headline Prime
(1) Automation
Aiden Toys to cut
3,000 US jobs due
to automation
Twenty-five new fully automated
lines have been installed in its
five remaining plants.
(2) Offshore to
China
Aiden Toys to cut
3,000 US jobs;
opens new site
in China
Aiden Toys opened a new
production site in Shaoguan,
China in February.
(3) Offshore to
Canada
Aiden Toys to cut
3,000 US jobs;
opens new site
in Canada
Aiden Toys opened a new
production site in Windsor,
Canada in February.
(4) Import
competition
Aiden Toys to cut
3,000 US jobs
due to import
competition
The company is downsizing
due to import competition from
countries with lower labor costs,
a spokesperson said in a statement.
(5) Immigration
Aiden Toys to cut
3,000 in US; hires
immigrants in
remaining plants
Aiden Toys will continue to
hire workers at its six
remaining plants. The new hires
are expected to be mainly
immigrant workers.
(6) No reason
Aiden Toys to
cut 3,000 in US
(No reason listed)
(7) Control
Company Spotlight:
Aiden Toys Inc
(No job loss)
Note: The treatment effects of all experimental conditions can be found in the Appendix. In the main
text, for clarity, I report results from (1), (2), (4), and (5) relative to the control (7).
After the news article, we measured individuals’ preferences on a number of policies
related to globalization and automation. Respondents were asked, “what should the
government do to help workers affected by layoffs?” The list of policies to be rated were
displayed in randomized order (increase tariffs, restrict immigration, restrict firms’ use
of technology, provide assistance to workers, provide a universal basic income, tax incen-
tives for firms to stay in or return to the United States, and do nothing). Respondents
gave each policy a rating of 1 (strongly oppose) to 5 (strongly agree). In the analy-
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sis, I focus on three policies — trade, immigration, and technology.37 Although I did
not intend to drop respondents post-treatment as it would introduce biases of unknown
direction and magnitude (Aronow, Baron and Pinson, 2018), the survey included a ma-
nipulation check to gauge the quality of the sample to address recent critiques of the
survey platform (Chmielewski and Kucker, 2020). Lastly, respondents were debriefed
according to the guidelines set forth by the University’s Institutional Review Board. The
experimental set-up and the list of outcome measures can be found in the Appendix.
3.5 Results
There are 2,471 respondents in the sample. The sample has an average age of 38.4 and
gender is roughly balanced (50.47% female and 49.53% male). The average respondent
is White (73% White), has a family income of $50,000 to $59,999, and some college
experience. About 42%, 28%, and 28% of respondents identify as Democrats, Republi-
cans, and Independents respectively.38 Balance tests show that random assignment to
treatment was largely successful (see Appendix A2).39
Table 12 shows respondents’ baseline attitudes. In this subsample of respondents in
the control condition, people on average prefer the government to provide compensation
to workers affected by layoffs over resorting to protectionism, and prefer the government
to enact protectionist policies over doing nothing at all. Overall, opinion toward global
economic integration is more polarized than that of worker compensation and govern-
ment inaction. Republicans are considerably more anti-immigration than Democrats and
37The preregistered analysis plan contained hypothesis about automation threat’s impact on atti-
tudes toward universal basic income, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
38In the 2016 American National Election Studies, 35%, 37%, and 28% of respondents identify as
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents respectively. As the main goal of the experiment was to
test the hypothesis, I am less concerned about the underrepresentation of Republicans. I will explore
issues related to generalization in the discussion (section 5.3).
39Balance is not achieved for “education.” I thus ran a specification that includes controls for the
covariate, and the results hold.
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Table 12: Baseline attitudes (control condition)
Policies Overall Democrats Republicans Independents
Tax incentive to stay in/return to US 4.01 3.85 4.28 3.92
Financial assistance 3.96 4.23 3.65 3.94
Universal basic income 3.15 3.61 2.60 3.10
Restrict immigration 3.08 2.34 3.86 3.35
Increase tariffs 2.82 2.34 3.44 2.86
Do nothing 2.24 1.87 2.60 2.37
Restrict technology 1.90 1.70 2.15 1.95
Observations 353 142 106 101
Note: Variables range from 1 to 5. They are recoded such that a higher value signifies higher level of
average support for the policy.
Independents. The baseline support for free trade among Republicans in this sample is
also lower than that among Democrats. This deviates from the conventional public opin-
ion pattern in the last 30 years, but it is consistent with the findings in the latest wave
of American National Election Studies in 2016. The incumbent Republican President’s
rhetoric may have contributed to increased resistance to trade among self-identified Re-
publicans and encouraged many Democrats to take the opposite position.
Employment threats and policy responses
Respondents in treatment conditions were primed to think about a particular source
of job loss, and those in the control condition were not. Afterwards, I asked subjects
to rate a list of mainstream proposals that address unemployment. For the sake of
clarity and length, the main text focuses on the evaluation of immigration, trade, and
technology policies, but all results can be found in the Appendix. Overall, 89 percent of
participants passed a manipulation check; in other words, 11 percent of respondents were
non-compliers. More conservative intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, as opposed to complier-
average causal effects (CACE), are reported below (Gerber and Green, 2012; Aronow,
Baron and Pinson, 2018).
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Immigration and trade restrictions
Figures 10 and 11 show the treatment effects of various job loss vignettes on respondents’
attitudes toward immigration and trade respectively. It is no surprise that priming
individuals to think about layoffs due to the hiring of immigrant workers leads to an
increased support for the government to “restrict the number of immigrants into the
United States” across the board. In the same vein, directly prompting individuals to
consider foreign import competition increases support for the government to “raise tariffs
on foreign goods” overall. These results together with a manipulation check passage rate
of nearly 90% give us confidence that the experiment conditions worked as intended.
Figure 10: Support for immigration restrictions (marginal treatment effects relative to
the control)
Some respondents were primed about technological unemployment. It is implied
in the text that automated production lines were installed to replace human workers,
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Figure 11: Support for trade restrictions (marginal treatment effects relative to the
control)
leading to mass layoffs. Overall, the effects of the automation treatment on immigration
and trade policy preferences are both statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
overall treatment effect was “washed out” by partisans’ divergent reactions to the same
threat (Figures 10 and 11). As expected, partisans are motivated to arrive at conclusions
consistent with “their team’s positions.” On immigration, automation threat increases
hostility toward immigrants among self-identified Republicans (by 0.38 on a scale of 1
to 5) but has no impact on Democrats. On trade, automation threat shores up support
for trade barriers among self-identified Democrats (by 0.44 on a scale of 1 to 5) but has
no impact on Republicans. The size of the treatment effect of technology shock is at
least as big as that of that of other globalization shocks, which is surprising given that
protectionism is a seemingly more direct response to import competition and offshoring
than automation. One interpretation is that the relatively high salience of trade and
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offshoring at the time of the study meant that many respondents (including those in the
control condition) had these issues in mind even without prompting, thereby dampening
the effects of experimentally cueing trade and offshoring shocks.
These results suggest that accelerated technological change and its accompanying
pressures on workers may intensify the public’s attempts to resist globalization. Strik-
ingly, this displacement of blame toward outgroups, in this experimental set-up, occurs
without explicit politicization of the issue and without any mention of immigrants and
foreign workers in the text. In the real word, political rhetoric emphasizing ingroup-
outgroup differences is extremely common, and is often intentionally used by elites to
achieve specific political goals (Ryan, 2012).
Additional tests were performed to explore other possible conditional treatment ef-
fects of automation threat. Contrary to expectations proposed earlier, I find that the
displacement of blame from automation to outgroups is not conditional on education,
prior attitudes toward technology, or self-assessed viability in the labor market. The
inclusion of various interaction terms measuring respondents’ education attainment, pre-
treatment appraisal of workplace technology, and self-estimated time needed to secure
reemployment in the event of a layoff has no statistically significant effect on opinion on
trade and immigration policies. These results suggest that it is partisan identity, not
personal circumstances or attributes, that shapes how individuals respond to anxiety
from technological change.
Technological restrictions
This displacement of blame from automation toward globalization does not work in the
other direction. Figure 12 shows that priming individuals about globalization-related
job losses — offshoring to China, import competition, and immigration — has no impact
on their support for technological restrictions.
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Figure 12: Support for technological restrictions (marginal treatment effects relative to
the control)
However, those who read about technological displacement are more likely to support
government efforts to “restrict companies’ use of new technology.” Among all respon-
dents who received the technology shock treatment, the vignette increases support for
technological restrictions by 0.22 (on a scale of 1 to 5).40 The treatment has no effect on
Republicans. The relatively wide confidence intervals of the estimates for Republicans
may be indicative of its lower sample size, but it may also signify high heterogeneity of
the treatment effect amongst Republicans. The conditional treatment effect is largest
for Democrats. The treatment increases the favorability of technological restrictions by
0.39 (on a scale of 1 to 5). This shows that innovation and technological progress, while
supported by many, may not be totally immune to opposition. Information about tech-
nology’s negative labor effects could potentially lead to increased demands to slow its
40This contradicts (Zhang, 2019) which finds that reading a news article that explained the existent
and future impact of workplace automation had no impact on people’s technology policy preferences.
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spread.
That being said, these treatment effects have to be interpreted very carefully. Table
12 shows that the baseline support for restrictive technological policies are low, in fact,
the lowest among the list of policies being evaluated. Even for the subsample of indi-
viduals who received the automation treatment, the average evaluation for restrictive
technological polices is 2.1 (on a scale of 1 to 5), which roughly translates to “somewhat
disagree.” Among Democrats who received the automation treatment, the average rat-
ing is also 2.1. Taken altogether, the knowledge or a reminder of automation’s threat to
jobs may move opinion on technology to a more negative direction, but people remain
fairly hesitant about policies that would hinder innovation and progress.41
In sum, while automation anxiety does not lead to a wholesale increase in global-
ization opposition, the findings suggest that the threat of technological displacement
may increase hostility toward specific groups of people whom party loyalists already
find objectionable or undesirable. In response to automation anxiety, Republicans pre-
fer stronger limitations on immigrants, while Democrats favor more stringent controls
on imports produced by purportedly cheaper workers. This blame transference hap-
pened without explicit or even implicit attempts in the experiment to solicit partisan
responses in the experiment. These effects may possibly be more pronounced in the
real-world where such attempts are prevalent. The study also finds that automation
anxiety increases support for limits on technology, contrary to our expectations, but the
overall support for these restrictions remains low.
41A further exploration of other heterogeneous treatment effects in the preregistered study can be
found in the appendix.
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Robustness checks and correcting for multiple comparisons
The robustness of these findings was put to additional tests. To address concerns about
multiple comparisons, I adjusted the p-values in the reported results below using the
Benjamini–Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate (FDR). The adjusted
p-values are shown alongside the unadjusted ones in Tables 13 and 14. A vast of majority
of the findings hold. The only exception is that the treatment effect of the immigration
prime on immigration policy preference is no longer significant among self-identified
Republican respondents (adjusted p<.10).
Table 13: ITT among Democrats with Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Trade B-H adj p Immigration B-H adj p Technology B-H adj p
Automation 0.44∗∗ 0.01 0.13 0.56 0.39∗∗ 0.01
(3.08) (0.85) (3.22)
Offshore to China 0.28 0.16 0.14 0.54 0.18 0.31
(1.95) (0.96) (1.47)
Import competition 0.30∗ 0.14 0.13 0.56 0.02 0.94
(2.04) (0.84) (0.17)
Immigration 0.44∗∗ 0.01 0.46∗∗ 0.01 0.21 0.20
(3.14) (3.16) (1.73)
cons 2.31∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗
(22.69) (21.92) (19.58)
N 739 739 739 739 739 739
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14: ITT among Republicans with Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Trade B-H adj p Immigration B-H adj p Technology rB-H adj p
Automation 0.01 0.94 0.38∗ 0.05 0.25 0.32
(0.08) (2.56) (1.41)
Offshore to China 0.06 0.84 0.26 0.19 -0.07 0.84
(0.38) (1.80) (-0.41)
Import competition 0.12 0.62 0.14 0.54 -0.05 0.88
(0.73) (1.00) (-0.29)
Immigration -0.02 0.94 0.34∗ 0.08 -0.20 0.46
(-0.11) (2.33) (-1.15)
cons 3.44∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗
(30.58) (38.13) (17.68)
N 502 502 502 502 502 502
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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In addition, I ran a set of alternative specifications. Although the balance tests show
that random assignment to treatment was largely successful, education was not balanced
across some experimental groups. Including the unbalanced covariate as a control did
not change the paper’s results or conclusions. Furthermore, I also reanalyzed the data
for the treatment effects among only compliers to check for robustness. Compliers are
defined as those who correctly answered a factual question about the article they read.
Although the intent-to-treat (ITT) approach taken in the main text generally leads to
more conservative estimates, I reanalyzed the data for causal effects among the com-
pliers to check for any meaningful discrepancies. Dropping respondents who failed the
manipulation check from the sample only led to larger causal effects.
External validity
The primary goal of the experiment was to identify the causal effect of automation
threat on policy preferences. Experiments provide good solutions to the problems of
unobserved confounders, reverse causality, and other common challenges to inference.
While internal validity is generally not a concern for experimental studies, it is impor-
tant to discuss the extent to which the approach may affect the generalizability of the
findings to the overall American population. Some may be concerned that the online
population may be incomparable to the broader population that exists offline. Arguably,
the line between online and offline samples is quickly blurring as Internet users become
increasingly common in the United States. Over 80 percent of Americans report using
the Internet daily and only 10 percent of them had never used the Internet (Pew Re-
search Center, 2019a). A more problematic aspect of using an online survey to study
technology attitudes is perhaps the fact that the study had unlikely reached people who
eschew technology — they are unlikely to be clicking away on an online survey form! If
that is the case, the results may have overestimated support for workplace technology
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and underestimated the negative effect of automation anxiety on technology attitudes.
However, results from nationally representative surveys reported at the beginning of the
paper show broad-based support for technology, implying that the share of Luddites is
likely to be small, even offline.
The sampled individuals may be more interested in (and know more about) current
affairs than the average American. After all, they self-selected into participating in a
social science study. However, this observation should not pose a serious critique to the
proposed theory as the theory does not require people to have high levels of political
sophistication. All an individual has to know is their partisan identity and “their team’s
position” on some of the most high salience issues in America today. One has to be able
to answer, for example, “does my party support open immigration?” In daily life, such
reminders are both frequent and prevalent. Additionally, the experiment shows that,
even without such reminders and partisan cues, people displace blame and default to
penalizing their party’s “favorite enemy” when confronted with automation anxiety.
3.6 Conclusion
While the impact of technology on employment and wages is well documented (Goldin
and Sokoloff, 1982; Acemoglu, 1998; Bekman, Bound and Machin, 1998; Jaimovich and
Siu, 2012; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020), we do
not know much about people’s attitudes toward technology and how they may cope with
the accelerating pace of technological change in the workplace. Reviewing a variety of
nationally representative surveys, this paper shows that American workers have largely
positive attitudes toward workplace technology. Technology has positive effects on work-
ers’ day-to-day experience that is not generally captured in studies in macroeconomics.
Most Americans also believe that technological development is crucial in maintaining
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the United States’s competitiveness in the world. These favorable appraisals of tech-
nology coexist with widespread concerns about technological displacement. Nearly 8
in 10 Americans find the scenario in which robots and computers perform most of the
jobs that are currently done by humans to be at least somewhat realistic (Pew Research
Center, 2017a).
Throughout history, when labor-replacing technology threatened workers, resistance
was the norm rather than the exception. Although people today have much greater fa-
miliarity with — and possibly a stronger liking of — technology, I find that technology is
not entirely immune to political opposition, running counter to my initial expectations.
Using an online survey experiment, I primed participants with news articles that empha-
size different sources of employment threat. Those who read a story about mass layoffs
following the installation of fully automated production lines are slightly more likely than
those in the control condition to support government restrictions on technology. The
size of the effect is conditional on partisanship: a reminder of automation’s impact on
employment increases the popularity of technological restrictions among self-identified
Democrats, but not Republicans. Democrats are perhaps more willing to sacrifice bene-
fits from unhindered technological progress in exchange for higher levels of job security
for workers. That being said, it is important to note that technological restrictions still
received very low levels of support overall, even when people are directly reminded of
technology’s negative impact on employment. Currently, a majority of Americans are
still hesitant, if not outright unwilling, to impose limits on technological development
and innovation.
How do people then cope with job anxieties from technological change — a trend
they support? This study shows that people tend to respond to automation anxiety
by demanding government actions against other sources of employment threats that
are ostensibly caused by outgroups. While economic phenomena and crises often have
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multiple causes, emphasizing one or a few external and controllable sources as expla-
nations of negative outcomes helps preserve feelings of internal agency and personal
control. Results show that direct cues about technological displacement make Republi-
cans more likely to demand tighter restrictions on immigrants and Democrats more likely
to support higher tariffs to limit goods produced by foreign workers. Citizens cope with
automation anxiety by blaming and penalizing groups that they consider unwelcome or
objectionable in accordance with their partisanship. With robots increasingly displacing
labor, people want to stop outgroups from further dividing the pie.
These findings contribute to a nascent but growing effort in political economy to
understand the political effects of technological change. While technological change has
not triggered a widespread backlash against technology, automation anxiety may have
contributed to a populist revolt against globalization. Employment anxiety from au-
tomation evokes individuals’ protectionist instincts. Remarkably, hostility toward trade
and immigration persists and even intensifies when people are explicitly told, in the
experiment, that a factor other than trade or immigration (in this case, automation)
contributed to the layoffs. As sensing technologies, robotics, and machine learning con-
tinue to develop, technology’s disruptions to the labor market will likely grow. In the
absence of policies to lessen the distress and potential negative labor effects of technol-
ogy, accelerated automation may continue to escalate attempts to resist globalization.
The reversal of globalization could in turn wipe out the efficiency and welfare gains
from the relatively free flow of goods, people, and capital that marked the international
economy of the past decades.
On the other hand, if continued technological innovation is conducive to long-term
economic growth, it is perhaps reassuring that technological change of late has not
inspired a new wave of Luddism. Despite concerns about technological unemployment,
the general public shares a predilection for technology. This helps explain why anti-
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technology policy proposals are few and far between. In many ways, American policies
(e.g. tax codes) are even biased in favor of capital and against labor. However, if
history is any indication, the long-term reward of prosperity and human welfare may
not be enough to sustain an enduring coalition for automation. During the Industrial
Revolution, short-run disruptions in terms of employment and wages incited worker
rebellions against machines. For many of them, these “short-run” effects — in economics
parlance — outlasted their lifetime.
While this study finds a broad-based disdain for firm-based government restrictions
on technology, it does not rule out resistance to automation that may erupt in other
forms or within subpopulations. Future public opinion studies may consider further
exploring different dimensions of technology policies, such as rolling back existing tax
incentives designed to promote automation (in the case of South Korea) and taxing
robots as if they were humans (as proposed by business leaders like Bill Gates). In
addition, it may be a fruitful endeavor to examine the conditions in which the public’s
enthusiasm toward technology might break down. These factors may include the pace
of technological adoption, the magnitude of its effects, and anti-technology mobilization
efforts within a network (e.g. unions). Results here suggest that ideology matters.
Opposition to technology is more likely to come from the left than from the right. It
might be a promising area for future research to examine these and other potential
drivers of opposition to technology.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Balance table
Table 15: Balance table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable China Canada Import Technology Immigration Layoff
Age 0.87 0.48 -0.15 0.49 0.92 0.79
(0.38) (0.62) (0.87) (0.61) (0.31) (0.40)
Gender (Male) -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.38) (0.74) (0.35) (0.53) (0.85) (0.62)
Party -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.04
(0.44) (0.76) (0.49) (0.98) (0.58) (0.53)
Nationalism 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.68) (0.67) (0.73) (0.74) (0.93) (0.75)
Union 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.62) (0.66) (0.92) (0.56) (0.77) (0.87)
Education 0.11 0.12 0.37∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.08 0.23∗∗
(0.31) (0.28) (0.00) (0.01) (0.45) (0.03)
Family Income 0.16 0.03 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.26
(0.50) (0.89) (0.23) (0.34) (0.40) (0.29)
Worry Lose Job -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.97) (0.85) (0.98) (0.68) (0.84) (0.88)
White Identity 0.04 0.08 0.12 -0.02 -0.08 0.06
(0.75) (0.54) (0.33) (0.85) (0.53) (0.61)
Observations compared 703 705 707 711 707 703
Note: Difference of means test comparing respondents in the control condition to those
assigned to each treatment.
77
Survey Instrument
The full instrument can be found in part C. For easy reference, parts A and B contain
the experimental conditions and outcome measures.
A. Experimental conditions (randomly assigned to respondents, formatted to mimic an
online Reuters article, including a photo of a generic toy factory):
• Control (Company profile): Company Spotlight: Aiden Toys Inc
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc operates 10 factories in
the United States. They are located in Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. It
currently employs about 10,000 workers. The company is expected to produce
the same amount of toys in the next financial year, the spokesperson said in a
statement.
Aiden Toys reported that sales rose by a modest 0.7 percent last year. It did not
specify its revenue, saying only that it is consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 1 (Automation): Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 US jobs due to au-
tomation
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,500 of the company’s
10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company will be able to
produce the same amount of toys despite the closures, a spokesperson said in a
78
statement. Twenty-five new fully automated lines have been installed in its five
remaining plants.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 2 (Offshore to China): Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 US jobs; opens
new site in China
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s
10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company will be able to
produce the same amount of toys despite the closures, a spokesperson said in
a statement. Aiden Toys opened a new production site in Shaoguan, China in
February.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 3 (Offshore to Canada): Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 US jobs; opens
new site in Canada
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s
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10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company will be able to
produce the same amount of toys despite the closures, a spokesperson said in
a statement. Aiden Toys opened a new production site in Windsor, Canada in
February.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 4 (Import competition): Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 US jobs due to
import competition
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s
10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company is downsizing due
to import competition from countries with lower labor costs, a spokesperson said
in a statement.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 5: (Immigration):Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 in US; hires immi-
grants in remaining plants
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
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located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s
10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures. The company will be able to
produce the same amount of toys despite the closures, a spokesperson said in a
statement. Aiden Toys will continue to hire workers at its six remaining plants.
The new hires are expected to be mainly immigrant workers.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
• Treatment 6: (No reason): Aiden Toys to cut 3,000 in US
NEW YORK (Reuters) – The toymaker Aiden Toys Inc will close 4 of its 10
factories in the United States by July this year. The factories to be closed are
located in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Approximately 3,000 of the company’s
10,000 workers will be laid off due to the closures.
Aiden Toys recently reported that sales rose 0.7 percent last year. It did not specify
its revenue, saying only that revenues were consistent with the company’s internal
projections.
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Figure 13: Image used in the experiment (desktop)
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Figure 14: Image used in the experiment (mobile)
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B. Outcome measures (displayed to participants in a randomized order): “What should
the government do to help workers affected by layoffs?” (Strongly disagree – strongly
agree)
• The government should do nothing.
• The government should provide financial assistance to affected workers.
• The government should restrict companies’ use of new technology.
• The government should raise tariffs on foreign goods.
• The government should restrict the number of immigrants into the US.
• The government should give tax incentives for American companies to stay home
or return to the US.
• The government should provide a monthly basic income for citizens.
84
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Page 1 of 48https://umich.ca1.qualtrics.com/Q/EditSection/Blocks/Ajax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_8kyr3u2lp18nzwx&ContextLibraryID=UR_6KG49zH5QLnOIU5
IRB Consent, Job
We’re inviting you to participate in a research study. The survey will take about
12 minutes to complete.
 
We want to understand how Americans think about changes in the
workplace. You will be asked to answer questions about work in the United
States, rate a set of proposed policies, and respond to questions about an
article concerning an American manufacturer.
 
There will be a screener at the onset of the survey. If you do not qualify, we will
display a message to suggest you to return the survey to avoid being rejected
by us. 
Participation is completely voluntary. If you change your mind, you can
withdraw at anytime by closing the browser. Results will be kept confidential.
More information about the study will be available at the end of the survey. 
Before you proceed to the
survey, please complete the
captcha below.
Let's begin with some questions about you.
What is your gender?
How old are you?
Are you currently employed?
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Agree to proceed
 
Male
Female
Other
Employed full-time
Employed part-time, not seeking full-time work
C. Full instrument
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Have you ever held a full-time job?
You do not qualify for the survey. We suggest that you return the survey, or we
will have to reject the assignment.
Do not click next. The next button will bring you to the end of the survey. 
Currently employed: Job worry
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future?
In the event that you lose your current job, how long do you think it will take for
you to find similar employment to maintain your current lifestyle?
Do you think your next job will be better or worse than your current job in terms
of pay and job security?
Are you a member of a labor union?
Employed part-time, not seeking full-time work
Employed part-time, seeking full-time work
Unemployed, not seeking work
Unemployed, seeking work
Student
Homemaker
Retired
Yes, more than one
Yes, one
No
Not at all
Very little
Moderately
Very
Extremely
Less than a month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
1-2 years
2 years or more
Much better
Somewhat better
About the same
Somewhat worse
Much worse
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Are you a member of a labor union?
Unemployed seeking work: job worry
How long do you think it will take for you to find a full-time job?
Do you think your next job will be better or worse than your last full-time job in
terms of pay and job security?
Demographic and race-related questions
Are you a permanent resident or citizen of the United States?
How important is being American to you personally? 
You do not qualify for the survey. We suggest that you return the survey, or we
will have to reject the assignment.
Do not click next. The next button will bring you to the end of the survey. 
Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:
Yes
No
Less than a month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
1-2 years
More than two years
Much better
Somewhat better
About the same
Somewhat worse
Much worse
Yes
No
Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not at all important
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On a scale of 0-100, how would you rate the following groups on what we call
the feeling thermometer?
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and
warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that
you don’t feel favorable toward the group and that you don’t care too much for
that group.
How important is being white to your identity?
Open ended Q about econ
Now, consider some of the negative trends. 
What developments or factors have done more harm than good for American
workers in the last 30 years? 
There have been positive and negative developments in the American
economy. 
First, consider some of the positive trends. In your opinion, what developments
or factors have done more good than harm for American workers in the last 30
White
Black or African-American
Asian
Native American or Alaska Native
Hispanic or Latino
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
 
Whites     
Hispanics or Latinos     
Blacks     
Asian Americans     
Colder (Unfavorable) Warmer (Favorable)
 0 25 50 75 100
Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
Slightly important
Not at all important
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
88
5/15/20, 15:01Qualtrics Survey Software
Page 5 of 48https://umich.ca1.qualtrics.com/Q/EditSection/Blocks/Ajax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_8kyr3u2lp18nzwx&ContextLibraryID=UR_6KG49zH5QLnOIU5
or factors have done more good than harm for American workers in the last 30
years? 
Party ID, News, Tech
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of
Do you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
Do you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or Democratic Party?
On a scale of 1 to 10, do you think the world is better off or worse off because
of science and technology?
Technology (e.g. computers, machines, robots) at work has become much more
widespread in the past 30 years. There are benefits but also risks associated
with technological change.
What is your personal experience with technology at work?
Republican Party
Independent
Democratic Party
Strong
Not very strong
Strong
Not very strong
Closer to Republican
Closer to Democratic
Neither
Worse off: 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Better off: 10
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What is your personal experience with technology at work?
During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news,
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the internet, not including sports news?
During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news,
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the internet, not including sports news?
Regardless of your previous answer, choose three as your answer to this
question. 
We thank you for your interest and time. However, you failed our attention check
on the previous page. We suggest that you return the survey, or we will have to
reject the assignment.
Do not click next. The next button will bring you to the end of the survey. 
Treatment 1 - China
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Extremely positive
Moderately positive
Slightly positive
Neither positive nor negative
Slightly negative
Moderately negative
Extremely negative
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
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Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 2 - Canada
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 3 - Import
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 4 - Tech
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Treatment 4 - Tech
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 5 - Immigrant
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Control 1
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Control 2
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 1 (desktop) - China
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 2 (desktop) - Canada
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 3 (Desktop) - Import
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 4 (Desktop) - Tech
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Treatment 5 (Desktop) - Immigrant
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Control 1 (Desktop)
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Control 2 (Desktop)
In the following section, please take a moment to read the news report carefully
and respond to a few questions about it. You will later be asked to recall the gist
AND title of the article in order to remain in the survey.
Please consider this news article when you answer the next two sets of
questions. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
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Emotions
To what extent does the announcement by Aiden Toys Inc make you feel:
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Extremely Very Somewhat A little Not at all
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Policy responses
What should the government do to help workers affected by layoffs?
The government should do nothing.
The government should provide financial assistance to affected workers.
The government should restrict companies' use of new technology.
The government should raise tariffs on foreign goods. 
Please choose somewhat disagree.
   Extremely Very Somewhat A little Not at all
Angry   
Sad   
Anxious   
Optimistic   
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
108
5/15/20, 15:01Qualtrics Survey Software
Page 25 of 48https://umich.ca1.qualtrics.com/Q/EditSection/Blocks/Ajax/GetSurveyPrintPreview?ContextSurveyID=SV_8kyr3u2lp18nzwx&ContextLibraryID=UR_6KG49zH5QLnOIU5
The government should restrict the number of immigrants into the US.
The government should give tax incentives for American companies to stay
home or return to the US.
The government should provide a monthly basic income for citizens.
Manipulation check 1 (China)
What was the article you read about?  (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Manipulation check 2 (Canada)
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
A company is moving its factories to France
Factories are closing due to cheaper imports from other countries
Factories are closing due to new technology
A company is moving its factories to China
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
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What was the article you read about? (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Manipulation check 3 (Import)
What was the article you read about? (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Manipulation check 4 (tech)
What was the article you read about?  (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Factories are closing due to cheaper imports from other countries
Factories are closing due to new technology
A company is moving its factories to Canada
A tech company benefits from the recent "trade war" with China
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
A company is hiring more immigrant workers
A company is moving its factories to France
Factories are adopting new technology
Factories are closing due to cheaper imports from foreign countries
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
Factories are adopting new technology
Factories are hiring more immigrant workers
A parking garage is closing down
A farmer benefits from the recent "trade war" with China
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Manipulation check 5 (immigrant workers)
What was the article you read about?  (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Manipulation check 6 (Layoffs)
What was the article you read about?  (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
How common do you think is the news story depicted in the United States? 
Manipulation check 7 (Company spotlight)
What was the article you read about?  (Please choose carefully in order to fulfill
the HIT.)
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
Factories are hiring more immigrant workers
Factories are adopting new technology
A parking garage is closing down
A tech company benefits from the recent "trade war" with China
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
A company is replacing workers with machines
A tech company benefits from the recent "trade war" with China
A company is laying off many workers
A company is hiring a new managing director
Extremely common
Somewhat common
Neither common nor uncommon
Somewhat uncommon
Extremely uncommon
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Automation
We are interested in your views on new technology. Many work tasks can now
be performed or automated using computers and machines with limited human
assistance. 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Technology helps workers at their jobs.
Technology threatens workers' jobs.
Do you think technology increases or decreases companies' competitiveness?
Do you think the federal government should discourage companies from
adopting new technology, encourage companies to adopt new technology, or
stay out of this matter?
A company profile
A company is moving its factories to France
A company is hiring more immigrant workers
A company is hiring a new managing director
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Increase a lot
Increase a little
Neither increase nor decrease
Decrease a little
Decrease a lot
Strongly encourage
Somewhat encourage
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Automation (with job)
Now consider your own job. Do you think technology and automation has
helped or threatened your job?
Can you briefly share your experience with technology at work with us? Do you
like or dislike having these machines, computers, or devices?
On a scale of 1-10, how would you personally feel about having a robot assist
you at work?
 
Please enter a number between 1 (totally uncomfortable) and 10 (totally
comfortable).
Why do you think technology threatens jobs generally but not yours?
How automated is your job? 
If you have to guess, how automated will your job be in the future?
Somewhat encourage
Stay out of the matter
Somewhat discourage
Strongly discourage
Helped a lot
Helped somewhat
Neither helped nor threatened
Threatened somewhat
Threatened a lot
 
Your job     
Not at all
automated
Slightly
automated
Moderately
automated
Highly
automated
Completely
automated
 0 25 50 75 100
 
Your job in 5 years     
Your job in 10 years     
Your job in 20 years     
Not at all
automated
Slightly
automated
Moderately
automated
Highly
automated
Completely
automated
 0 25 50 75 100
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Does your job require you to perform the following types of tasks? 
Immigration
Now, we'd like to ask you some questions about immigration.
What do you think should be the the level of immigrants from foreign countries
permitted to come to the US?
   Never Sometimes
About half
the time
Most of
the time Always
Come up with
unusual ideas
about a given
topic or situation
  
Reconcile
differences
between
individuals
  
Provide personal
assistance,
medical attention,
and/or emotional
support to others
  
Work in cramped
work spaces that
requires getting
into awkward
positions
  
Quickly move your
hands or fingers to
manipulate or
assemble very
small objects
  
To be aware of
others’ reactions
and understand
why they react as
they do
  
Compose,
produce, and/or
perform works of
music, dance,
visual arts, and/or
drama
  
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Increased a lot
Increased a little
Left the same as it is now
Decreased a little
Decrease a lot
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Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health
and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out
more than they put in or put in more than they take out?
Do you think immigration is good or bad for the following?
What do you think is the percentage of foreign-born population in your zip
code and the United States respectively?
What do you think is the ideal percentage of foreign-born population in the
United States?
Trade
Take out a lot more
Take out a little more
Take out as much as they put in
Put in a little more
Put in a lot more
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
   Very good
Somewhat
good
Neither
good nor
bad
Somewhat
bad Very bad
American workers   
American
economy   
American culture
and way of life   
You and your
family   
 
Your zip code      
United States      
 0 20 40 60 80 100
 
Ideal           
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
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Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the US making free trade
agreements with other countries?
Generally, have increasing amounts of trade with other countries been good for
bad for these groups?
Offshoring
American companies are hiring foreign workers to produce products and
services abroad.
 
Do you think it is good or bad for the following groups?
Do you think the federal government should discourage companies to do this,
encourage companies to do this, or stay out of this matter?
Click Count: 0 clicks
Strongly favor
Somewhat favor
Neither favor nor oppose
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
   Very good
Somewhat
good
Neither
good nor
bad
Somewhat
bad Very bad
American workers   
American
consumers   
American
economy   
You and your
family   
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
   Very good
Somewhat
good
Neither
good nor
bad
Somewhat
bad Very bad
American workers   
American
economy   
You and your
family   
Strongly discourage
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Do you think manufacturing output in the United States has increased or
decreased in the past three decades? 
Conjoint
Universal Basic Income is discussed in many countries. Some governments are
exploring the possibility of providing a fixed, monthly, and unconditional income
for all citizens. Do you support or oppose such a system?
Would you prefer a need-based program more or less?
Imagine that the US government is launching a basic income program pilot. At
the pilot stage, access to the program will be limited to individuals who had lost
their jobs involuntarily in the past 3 years. Those in the basic income program
will receive a fixed monthly payment from the government indefinitely. 
You will see a total of ten profiles of individuals, two will be displayed at a time. 
Which of the two individuals do you think should have priority access to the
basic income program? 
Somewhat discourage
Stay out of the matter
Somewhat encourage
Strongly encourage
Increased
Stayed roughly the same
Decreased
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Strongly support
Support
Somewhat support
Neither support nor oppose
Somewhat oppose
Oppose
Strongly oppose
Prefer a lot less
Prefer less
No difference
Prefer more
Prefer a lot more
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 Individual 1 Individual 2
${e://Field/F-1-1} ${e://Field/F-1-1-1} ${e://Field/F-1-2-1}
${e://Field/F-1-2} ${e://Field/F-1-1-2} ${e://Field/F-1-2-2}
${e://Field/F-1-3} ${e://Field/F-1-1-3} ${e://Field/F-1-2-3}
${e://Field/F-1-4} ${e://Field/F-1-1-4} ${e://Field/F-1-2-4}
${e://Field/F-1-5} ${e://Field/F-1-1-5} ${e://Field/F-1-2-5}
${e://Field/F-1-6} ${e://Field/F-1-1-6} ${e://Field/F-1-2-6}
${e://Field/F-1-7} ${e://Field/F-1-1-7} ${e://Field/F-1-2-7}
${e://Field/F-1-8} ${e://Field/F-1-1-8} ${e://Field/F-1-2-8}
Individuals in the basic income program will receive a fixed monthly payment
from the government indefinitely. Please consider the profiles of two workers
who had lost their jobs involuntarily. 
Which of them should have priority access to the basic income program? 
 Individual 1 Individual 2
${e://Field/F-2-1} ${e://Field/F-2-1-1} ${e://Field/F-2-2-1}
${e://Field/F-2-2} ${e://Field/F-2-1-2} ${e://Field/F-2-2-2}
${e://Field/F-2-3} ${e://Field/F-2-1-3} ${e://Field/F-2-2-3}
${e://Field/F-2-4} ${e://Field/F-2-1-4} ${e://Field/F-2-2-4}
${e://Field/F-2-5} ${e://Field/F-2-1-5} ${e://Field/F-2-2-5}
${e://Field/F-2-6} ${e://Field/F-2-1-6} ${e://Field/F-2-2-6}
${e://Field/F-2-7} ${e://Field/F-2-1-7} ${e://Field/F-2-2-7}
${e://Field/F-2-8} ${e://Field/F-2-1-8} ${e://Field/F-2-2-8}
Individuals in the basic income program will receive a fixed monthly payment
from the government indefinitely. Please consider the profiles of two workers
who had lost their jobs involuntarily. 
Which of them should have priority access to the basic income program? 
 Individual 1 Individual 2
Individual 1
Individual 2
Individual 1
Individual 2
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${e://Field/F-3-1} ${e://Field/F-3-1-1} ${e://Field/F-3-2-1}
${e://Field/F-3-2} ${e://Field/F-3-1-2} ${e://Field/F-3-2-2}
${e://Field/F-3-3} ${e://Field/F-3-1-3} ${e://Field/F-3-2-3}
${e://Field/F-3-4} ${e://Field/F-3-1-4} ${e://Field/F-3-2-4}
${e://Field/F-3-5} ${e://Field/F-3-1-5} ${e://Field/F-3-2-5}
${e://Field/F-3-6} ${e://Field/F-3-1-6} ${e://Field/F-3-2-6}
${e://Field/F-3-7} ${e://Field/F-3-1-7} ${e://Field/F-3-2-7}
${e://Field/F-3-8} ${e://Field/F-3-1-8} ${e://Field/F-3-2-8}
Individuals in the basic income program will receive a fixed monthly payment
from the government indefinitely. Please consider the profiles of two workers
who had lost their jobs involuntarily. 
Which of them should have priority access to the basic income program? 
 Individual 1 Individual 2
${e://Field/F-4-1} ${e://Field/F-4-1-1} ${e://Field/F-4-2-1}
${e://Field/F-4-2} ${e://Field/F-4-1-2} ${e://Field/F-4-2-2}
${e://Field/F-4-3} ${e://Field/F-4-1-3} ${e://Field/F-4-2-3}
${e://Field/F-4-4} ${e://Field/F-4-1-4} ${e://Field/F-4-2-4}
${e://Field/F-4-5} ${e://Field/F-4-1-5} ${e://Field/F-4-2-5}
${e://Field/F-4-6} ${e://Field/F-4-1-6} ${e://Field/F-4-2-6}
${e://Field/F-4-7} ${e://Field/F-4-1-7} ${e://Field/F-4-2-7}
${e://Field/F-4-8} ${e://Field/F-4-1-8} ${e://Field/F-4-2-8}
Individuals in the basic income program will receive a fixed monthly payment
from the government indefinitely. Please consider the profiles of two workers
who had lost their jobs involuntarily. 
Which of them should have priority access to the basic income program? 
 Individual 1 Individual 2
${e://Field/F-5-1} ${e://Field/F-5-1-1} ${e://Field/F-5-2-1}
Individual 1
Individual 2
Individual 1
Individual 2
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${e://Field/F-5-1} ${e://Field/F-5-1-1} ${e://Field/F-5-2-1}
${e://Field/F-5-2} ${e://Field/F-5-1-2} ${e://Field/F-5-2-2}
${e://Field/F-5-3} ${e://Field/F-5-1-3} ${e://Field/F-5-2-3}
${e://Field/F-5-4} ${e://Field/F-5-1-4} ${e://Field/F-5-2-4}
${e://Field/F-5-5} ${e://Field/F-5-1-5} ${e://Field/F-5-2-5}
${e://Field/F-5-6} ${e://Field/F-5-1-6} ${e://Field/F-5-2-6}
${e://Field/F-5-7} ${e://Field/F-5-1-7} ${e://Field/F-5-2-7}
${e://Field/F-5-8} ${e://Field/F-5-1-8} ${e://Field/F-5-2-8}
Occupation
We have only a few questions left about your occupation and
training/education.
What is your occupation? Please first select an occupational group. 
Business and financial operations
Which of the following best describes your job?
Individual 1
Individual 2
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Business and financial operations
Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance
Sales
Healthcare
Education and library
Architecture and engineering
Food
Computer and mathematical
Office and administrative support
Life, Physical, and Social Sciences
Construction, extraction, installation, and maintenance
Protective service
Personal care and service
Production
Transportation and material moving
Community and Social Service
Legal
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Computer and mathematical
Which of the following best describes your job?
Architecture and engineering
Which of the following best describes your job?
Life, Physical, and Social Sciences
Which of the following best describes your job?
Community and Social Service
Accountants and auditors
Management analysts
General and operations managers
Financial managers
Market research analysts
Human resources specialists
Loan officers
Other: Please specify
Software developers, applications
Computer support specialists
Computer systems analysts
Software developers, systems software
Network and computer systems administrators
Other: Please specify
Civil engineers
Materials engineers
Industrial engineers
Architect
Surveyors
Other: Please specify
Environmental scientists
Biological technicians
Urban and regional planners
Geoscientists
Medical scientists
Epidemiologists
Clinical, counseling, and social psychologist
Life, physical, and social science technicians
Chemist
Other: Please specify
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Community and Social Service
Which of the following best describes your job?
Legal
Which of the following best describes your job?
Education and library
Which of the following best describes your job?
Healthcare
Which of the following best describes your job?
Protective service
Social and human service assistants
Child, family, and social workers
Other: Please specify
Lawyers
Judges
Paralegals and legal assistants
Judicial law clerks
Arbitrators, magistrate judges, and magistrates
Other: Please specify
Postsecondary teachers
Elementary school teachers
Teaching assistants
Secondary school teachers
Middle school teachers
Preschool teachers
Substitute teachers
Other: Please specify
Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses
Physicians and surgeons
Registered nurses
Nursing assistants
Pharmacy technicians
Pharmacists
Home health aides
Medical assistants
Dental assistants
Other: Please specify
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Which of the following best describes your job?
Food
Which of the following best describes your job?
Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance
Which of the following best describes your job?
Personal care and service
Which of the following best describes your job?
Sales
Which of the following best describes your job?
Security guards
Police and sheriff’s patrol officers
Correctional officers and jailers
Firefighters
Other: Please specify
Fast food preparation and serving workers
Waiters and waitresses
Cooks
Bartenders
Dishwashers
Hosts and hostesses
Other: Please specify
Janitors and cleaners
Maids and housekeeping cleaners
Landscaping and groundskeeping workers
Other: Please specify
Personal care aides
Childcare workers
Recreational workers
Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists
Other: Please specify
Retail salespersons
Cashiers
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Office and administrative support
Which of the following best describes your job?
Construction, extraction, installation, and maintenance
Which of the following best describes your job?
Production
Which of the following best describes your job?
Transportation and material moving
Sales representatives in wholesale and manufacturing
First-line supervisors of retail sales workers
Counter and rental clerks
Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents
Other: Please specify
Office clerks, general
Customer service representatives
Secretaries and administrative assistants
Stock clerks and order fillers
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks
Receptionists
First-line supervisors of office and administrative staff
Other: Please specify
First-line supervisors of construction trades and extraction workers
Carpenters
Construction laborers
Other: Please specify
Electricians
Automotive service technicians and mechanics
Heating, air condition, and refrigeration mechanics
Plumbers, pipefitters
First-line supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers
Machinists
First-line supervisors of production and operating workers
Assemblers and fabricators
Welders, cutters, and brazers
Packaging and filling machine operators
Other: please specify
Production worker - helpers
Inspectors, testers, sorters
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Transportation and material moving
Which of the following best describes your job?
Job
Now, in your own words, can you describe your current job in a few sentences:
What is your job title? What are your usual activities and duties at this job?
Last job
What was your last job? Please first select an occupational group. 
Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers
First-line supervisors of transport and material moving workers
Industrial truck and tractor operators
Heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers
Bus drivers
Other: please specify
Light truck or delivery drivers
Packers (by hand)
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds
Last Click: 0 seconds
Page Submit: 0 seconds
Click Count: 0 clicks
Education and library
Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance
Architecture and engineering
Legal
Personal care and service
Healthcare
Transportation and material moving
Sales
Construction, extraction, installation, and maintenance
Office and administrative support
Production
Protective service
Computer and mathematical
Food
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2-Business and financial operations
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Computer and mathematical
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Architecture and engineering
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Life, Physical, and Social Sciences
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
Life, Physical, and Social Sciences
Business and financial operations
Community and Social Service
Accountants and auditors
Management analysts
General and operations managers
Financial managers
Market research analysts
Human resources specialists
Loan officers
Other: Please specify
Software developers, applications
Computer support specialists
Computer systems analysts
Software developers, systems software
Network and computer systems administrators
Other: Please specify
Civil engineers
Materials engineers
Industrial engineers
Architect
Surveyors
Other: Please specify
Environmental scientists
Biological technicians
Urban and regional planners
Geoscientists
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2-Community and Social Service
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Legal
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Education and library
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Healthcare
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
Medical scientists
Epidemiologists
Clinical, counseling, and social psychologist
Life, physical, and social science technicians
Chemist
Other: Please specify
Social and human service assistants
Child, family, and social workers
Other: Please specify
Lawyers
Judges
Paralegals and legal assistants
Judicial law clerks
Arbitrators, magistrate judges, and magistrates
Other: Please specify
Postsecondary teachers
Elementary school teachers
Teaching assistants
Secondary school teachers
Middle school teachers
Preschool teachers
Substitute teachers
Other: Please specify
Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses
Physicians and surgeons
Registered nurses
Nursing assistants
Pharmacy technicians
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2-Protective service
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Food
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Personal care and service
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
Pharmacy technicians
Pharmacists
Home health aides
Medical assistants
Dental assistants
Other: Please specify
Security guards
Police and sheriff’s patrol officers
Correctional officers and jailers
Firefighters
Other: Please specify
Fast food preparation and serving workers
Waiters and waitresses
Cooks
Bartenders
Dishwashers
Hosts and hostesses
Other: Please specify
Janitors and cleaners
Maids and housekeeping cleaners
Landscaping and groundskeeping workers
Other: Please specify
Personal care aides
Childcare workers
Recreational workers
Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists
Other: Please specify
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2-Sales
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Office and administrative support
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Construction, extraction, installation, and maintenance
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
2-Production
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
Other: Please specify
Retail salespersons
Cashiers
Sales representatives in wholesale and manufacturing
First-line supervisors of retail sales workers
Counter and rental clerks
Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents
Other: Please specify
Office clerks, general
Customer service representatives
Secretaries and administrative assistants
Stock clerks and order fillers
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks
Receptionists
First-line supervisors of office and administrative staff
Other: Please specify
First-line supervisors of construction trades and extraction workers
Automotive service technicians and mechanics
Heating, air condition, and refrigeration mechanics
First-line supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers
Electricians
Plumbers, pipefitters
Carpenters
Construction laborers
Other: Please specify
Assemblers and fabricators
Other: please specify
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2-Transportation and material moving
Which of the following best describes your previous job?
Last job
Why did you leave your last job? (Choose multiple if needed)
Factual questions
What is your highest level of education?
What is your household family income?
Inspectors, testers, sorters
First-line supervisors of production and operating workers
Production worker - helpers
Machinists
Welders, cutters, and brazers
Packaging and filling machine operators
Industrial truck and tractor operators
Other: please specify
Light truck or delivery drivers
Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers
Bus drivers
Heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers
Packers (by hand)
First-line supervisors of transport and material moving workers
Contract ended
Other (please specify)
Disability
Reached retirement age
Technological change
Company closure or restructuring
8th grade or below
9th grade to 11th grade
High school graduate
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional school degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, JD)
Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)
Less than $10,000
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What is your 5-digit zip code?
What do you think is the unemployment rate in your county? (0-100%)
What do you think is the unemployment rate in the United States? (0-100%)
Debrief
IMPORTANT: Please make sure to go to the next page to have your answers
recorded and receive a completion code. Your responses will be deleted if you exit
the browser now.
 
********************
 
Thank you for your participation in our study! Your participation is greatly appreciated. You
will find more information about the study below.
Purpose of the Study:
This study is about mass attitudes toward globalization and automation. This survey aims
to collect baseline data on public opinion toward trade, immigration, and workplace
automation. In addition, it seeks to explore the effects of information (in this case, a news
article) on attitudes.
In order to test the project’s hypotheses, the survey included a fictitious article about the
closure of toy factories. Please note that Aiden Toys Inc. does not in fact exist. We
apologize for the use of a fictitious article.
Confidentiality:
Your responses will be kept strictly confidential. No personally identifying information has
been collected during the process of the survey (e.g. name, exact address). If you have
$10,000 - $19,999
$20,000 - $29,999
$30,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $59,999
$60,000 - $69,999
$70,000 - $79,999
$80,000 - $89,999
$90,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000-$199,999
More than $200,000
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Powered by Qualtrics
been collected during the process of the survey (e.g. name, exact address). If you have
any concerns and/or would like your data removed from the study and permanently
deleted please contact the researcher, Nicole Wu at nicolewu@umich.edu.
Once again, thank you for your participation in this study!
Random ID
Here is your completion code: ${e://Field/Random%20ID}
 
Copy this value to paste into Mturk.
 
When you have copied this ID, please make sure to click the next button to
submit the survey. Again, thank you for your time and responses!
Please enter your MTurk ID. This ID will be deleted within a week after HIT
review.
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Additional Results
Study preregistration
This study was registered with EGAP before its launch. The preregistration documents
can be found here: https://osf.io/8b4kd. Some of the preregistered hypotheses were
not formalized in this paper, but where nonetheless discussed in the results for orga-
nizational clarity. A number of expectations of heterogeneous treatment effects were
preregistered based on ones partisanship, educational level, and other pre-treatment
attitudinal attributes. The main text of this manuscript focuses on treatment effects
conditioned on partisanship. Other hetereogenous treatment effects conditioned on per-
sonal attributes and other attitudinal attributes were discussed in the results section. In
addition, some respondents were also a part of a choice-based conjoint experiment related
to guaranteed monthly income/welfare that was conducted as a part of the preregistered
study. The topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
Not all outcome measures and experimental conditions were included in the write-up.
For transparency, they are included below.
Outcome measures
Table 16: Policy preferences (full sample)
Policies (Outcome measures) Overall Democrats Republicans Independents
Tax incentive to stay in or return to US 4.02 3.93 4.23 3.99
Financial assistance 3.90 4.22 3.55 3.79
Universal basic income 3.16 3.67 2.53 2.99
Restrict immigration 3.10 2.47 4.08 3.15
Increase tariffs 2.92 2.57 3.52 2.91
Do nothing 2.21 1.89 2.60 2.30
Restrict technology 1.94 1.87 2.13 1.90
Observations 2,471 1,049 683 693
Note: Variables range from 1 to 5. They are recoded such that a higher value signifies higher
level of average support for the policy.
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Trade restrictions
Figure 15: Outcome measure: increase tariffs (marginal treatment effects relative to the
control)
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Immigration restrictions
Figure 16: Outcome measure: restrict immigration (marginal treatment effects relative
to the control)
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Technological restrictions
Figure 17: Outcome measure: restrict technology use (marginal treatment effects relative
to the control)
As there are very few existing studies of technology policy preferences, it is worthwhile to
explore other potential explanations for such attitudes. First, we may differences in such
attitudes between high- and low-skilled workers as training may affect their confidence
in using computers and machines. Second, workers who personally had bad experiences
with technology may be more likely to support technological restrictions. Lastly, workers
who believe themselves to be more viable in the labor market may be willing to tolerate
job risks associated with automation, leading to lower support for restrictive technology
policies. These factors — higher education, pre-treatment enthusiasm about workplace
technology, and one’s confidence in the labor market — may blunt the treatment effects
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in the study. Table 17 explores other possible heterogeneous treatment effects using
treatment-by-covariate interactions. Running counter to the above conjectures, none of
the interaction effects are statistically significant in Table 17. In the models without
interactive terms, we find that those have had more negative personal experience with
technology at work (model 4) and those who believe that they will need a longer time to
seek alternative employment after a layoff (model 6) are more likely to favor government
restrictions on technology use.
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Table 17: Preferences on technology policy (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatments
Automation 0.22∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.15 0.25∗∗ 0.47 0.18∗ 0.21
(2.71) (2.78) (0.46) (2.99) (0.98) (1.99) (0.95)
Offshore to China 0.02 0.01 -0.43 0.03 0.17 -0.00 0.10
(0.26) (0.15) (-1.27) (0.35) (0.38) (-0.02) (0.47)
Import competition -0.05 -0.06 -0.54 -0.04 -0.38 -0.11 0.10
(-0.61) (-0.72) (-1.52) (-0.45) (-0.83) (-1.28) (0.43)
Immigration 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.02 0.45 0.02 0.27
(0.31) (0.31) (0.99) (0.29) (1.01) (0.22) (1.26)
Covariates
Education -0.01 -0.03
(-0.35) (-0.70)
Automation × Edu 0.02
(0.26)
Offshore to China × Edu 0.08
(1.35)
Import competition × Edu 0.09
(1.37)
Immigration × Edu -0.06
(-0.93)
Work technology appraisal -0.21∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
(-8.53) (-3.64)
Automation × Tech -0.04
(-0.48)
Offshore to China × Tech -0.02
(-0.32)
Import competition × Tech 0.06
(0.76)
Immigration × Tech -0.07
(-0.98)
Labor market struggle 0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(6.41) (3.61)
Automation × LMS -0.02
(-0.20)
Offshore to China × LMS -0.04
(-0.55)
Import competition × LMS -0.08
(-1.02)
Immigration × LMS -0.11
(-1.28)
cons 1.90∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(32.19) (16.21) (9.13) (20.07) (9.54) (17.55) (9.09)
N 1769 1731 1731 1727 1727 1577 1577
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Tax incentives for companies to onshore
Figure 18: Outcome measure: Tax incentives for companies to onshore (marginal treat-
ment effects relative to the control)
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Financial assistance
Figure 19: Outcome measure: Financial assistance (marginal treatment effects relative
to the control)
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Universal basic income
Figure 20: Outcome measure: Universal basic income (marginal treatment effects rela-
tive to the control)
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Do nothing
Figure 21: Outcome measure: Do nothing (marginal treatment effects relative to the
control)
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Numeric results
Table 18: ITT among Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tariff restrictimmg restricttech onshore financial ubi nothing
Automation 0.44∗∗ 0.13 0.39∗∗ 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.02
(3.09) (0.85) (3.21) (0.62) (0.36) (0.98) (0.18)
Offshore to China 0.28 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.06
(1.95) (0.96) (1.47) (1.25) (0.05) (0.18) (0.48)
Offshore to Canada 0.27 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.12 -0.04
(1.93) (0.82) (1.83) (1.72) (0.48) (0.85) (-0.35)
Import competition 0.30∗ 0.13 0.02 -0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.05
(2.05) (0.84) (0.17) (-0.07) (-1.45) (0.22) (0.40)
Immigration 0.44∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.21 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.06
(3.15) (3.15) (1.72) (0.42) (0.17) (-0.51) (0.50)
No reason 0.05 -0.09 0.15 0.12 -0.02 0.18 0.00
(0.35) (-0.60) (1.26) (1.02) (-0.23) (1.26) (0.02)
cons 2.31∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(22.77) (21.90) (19.48) (47.21) (58.15) (35.37) (20.37)
N 1049 1049 1049 1049 1049 1049 1049
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
143
Table 19: ITT among Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
tariff restrictimmg restricttech onshore financial ubi nothing
Automation 0.01 0.38∗ 0.25 -0.21 -0.02 0.00 0.08
(0.08) (2.56) (1.42) (-1.67) (-0.12) (0.02) (0.43)
Offshore to China 0.06 0.26 -0.07 0.09 -0.33∗ -0.22 0.05
(0.40) (1.79) (-0.41) (0.77) (-2.03) (-1.06) (0.27)
Offshore to Canada 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.09 -0.11 0.05
(1.03) (0.18) (0.12) (0.67) (-0.51) (-0.51) (0.27)
Import Competition 0.12 0.14 -0.05 -0.15 -0.06 0.12 0.11
(0.76) (0.99) (-0.29) (-1.23) (-0.39) (0.60) (0.62)
Immigration -0.02 0.34∗ -0.20 -0.05 -0.10 -0.20 -0.11
(-0.11) (2.32) (-1.16) (-0.40) (-0.58) (-0.96) (-0.61)
No reason 0.19 0.45∗∗ -0.07 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.23
(1.23) (3.04) (-0.37) (-0.92) (-0.77) (-0.70) (-1.24)
cons 3.44∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗
(31.79) (38.01) (17.77) (50.72) (31.71) (18.21) (20.38)
N 683 683 683 683 683 683 683
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 4
Little to Lose: Exit Options and Technological Receptiveness
in China
4.1 Introduction
Recent research on automation has emphasized its negative implications on wages and
employment in industrialized economies (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Frey and Os-
borne, 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020). There is growing concern that technology
will have an even greater impact on developing nations, where larger shares of jobs are
susceptible to automation. One estimate suggests that it will be technically feasible to
automate 77 percent of jobs in China in the next few decades (Frey and Osborne, 2017;
Citi, 2016). Yet, the Chinese government promotes an initiative to “replace humans
with robots” (jiqi huanren). Beijing emphasizes the necessity and urgency to boost
technological adoption in its “Made in China 2025” campaign, which aims to maintain
China’s economic growth by shifting away from low value-added manufacturing and to-
ward high value-added production. To that end, various levels of Chinese government
have made concrete policy commitments, including subsidies to finance the production
and adoption of industrial robots, to modernize factories and help move companies up
the global value chain (Sharif and Huang, 2019a).
The seemingly dystopian slogan of “replacing humans with robots” can be found in
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official government publications since 2012. From time to time, the state media also
boasts about the effectiveness of the program, highlighting sizable labor savings due
to automation. What do manufacturing workers — the people the government wants
replaced — think about these automation efforts? This paper presents findings based
on semi-structured interviews with firm managers and manufacturing workers from 76
companies, 34 factory visits, and two original surveys of over 2,400 workers and 600
companies, covering 19 cities in southern coastal China. The combination of open-
ended techniques and survey methods allows hypotheses to be refined and updated in
the field and subsequently tested (Kapiszewski, MacLean and Read, 2015).
Contrary to the more pessimistic assessments of automation, most manufacturing
workers in Guangdong — buffered by steady increases in demand and chronic labor
shortage — appear to be unfazed by technological change at present. During interviews,
they more frequently emphasized the immediate and observable effects of technological
improvements, such as lowered risks of injury, less monotonous work, and improved
product quality, as opposed to wage or employment concerns. These on-the-ground
benefits of technological improvements play a critical role in shaping workers’ attitudes
toward technology, but are often overlooked in macroeconomic analyses of automation.
Paradoxically, insofar as laborers experience anxiety over the prospects of job au-
tomation, the survey finds that local workers — whom local labor regulations better
protect — are more worried about technological displacement than migrant workers.
Migrants with a non-local hukou (household registration) working in cities receive lower
average hourly wages than locals, have limited to no access to public services provided
by local city governments, and are less likely to be offered formal labor contracts (Song,
2014).
This important institution alters the cost of technological displacement felt by local
and non-local workers respectively by affecting their expectations, what is at stake, as well
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as the ease of securing comparable employment after a layoff. The migrants’ undesirable
circumstances — precarious positions, lower renumeration, out-of-pocket expenses for
essential public services that they are ineligible for, and sometimes years-long separation
from their children — lower their job expectations and make their jobs less painful to
lose. As these jobs provide little benefit to migrant workers, it is relatively unchallenging
for them to find a replacement that is no worse than the status quo. Furthermore,
the greater legal protection afforded to local workers (e.g., higher mandated levels of
employer contributions to insurance and retirement funds) ironically makes local workers
more expensive to hire and therefore less competitive than non-locals with the same
levels of skills. Local workers who have more to lose are therefore more worried about
automation.
This paper may be of interest to scholars of Chinese politics and those of com-
parative political economy. For the former, this work highlights the unintended labor
consequences of an unequal welfare system which discriminates based the hukou status
people inherited at birth. By allowing employers to opt for a lower, less generous tier of
social insurance for their non-local employees, local governments inadvertently hurt the
competitiveness of the group they sought to protect. It also reveals a possible tension
between local governments’ goals of promoting industrial upgrading via automation on
one hand, and appeasing their local working class constituents on the other. Unem-
ployed migrant workers without a local hukou can return to their hometowns or move
to a different city for opportunities, but local workers in coastal cities are less inclined
to relocate. If local workers feel more negatively affected by automation, local govern-
ments’ aggressive push to modernize factories may create a politically tricky situation
by irking their constituents.
More broadly, this paper offers a new perspective on technology attitudes that has im-
plications beyond China. Existing research uses individuals’ educational attainment and
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their job characteristics as a proxy for their susceptibility to automation (Frey and Os-
borne, 2017; Gallego, Kurer and Scho¨ll, 2018). While these factors are no doubt relevant
to analyses of mass attitudes, this paper additionally shows how institutions — existing
labor arrangements — shape technological receptiveness for people who face similar lev-
els of automation risks. For example, technological displacement may be more painful
for union auto workers than non-union retail workers in the United States, because a
well-compensated union job is harder to replace. Likewise, American manufacturing
workers may be more against automation than Chinese manufacturing workers, because
comparable exit options for the former are few and far between. While education level
affects one’s adaptability to technological change, existing levels of labor organization
often affect the value of the job at stake. Antagonism toward technology may be more
likely to originate from organized groups, although it is not yet clear how automation
may fundamentally shift the balance of capital-labor bargaining. If technological im-
provements are necessary to secure long-term economic competitiveness and growth,
it is then critical for scholars and policymakers to understand the concerns of those
who might attempt to halt those processes, and devise appropriate policy responses to
address these apprehensions.
4.2 Automation in China
Research on technology’s impact on workers is predominately based on the experience of
advanced economies. Technological change has been linked to job polarization, increas-
ing inequality, and labor displacement (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006; Goos, Manning
and Salomons, 2014; Frey and Osborne, 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020). The ef-
fects of technology on Chinese workers are much more ambiguous. While technological
improvements have diminished the number of routine jobs elsewhere, Du and Park (2017)
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find an increase in routine-intensive occupations in China as the growing export-oriented
sector specializes in less abstract, more routine tasks. Others show that automation ex-
posure has negative effects on wages and employment, hurting especially state-owned
sector, low-skilled, male, and prime-age and older workers (Giuntella and Wang, 2019).
Through participant-observation in nine factories in Dongguan in 2015 and 2016, Sharif
and Huang (2019b) show instances of labor deskilling (typically through moving to a
lower-paying department of the same company) and displacement, but also upskilling
(through additional training), as a result of technological upgrades.
It is worthwhile to investigate the changing and growing impact of technology on
workers as automation in China accelerates. China has a relatively low stock of industrial
robots per worker — ranking the last in robot density amongst G20 members — but
has witnessed the largest growth in robot flow in recent years (International Federation
of Robotics, 2019). The typical impetus to cut labor costs and improve product quality
via automation aside, some scholars believe that aggressive government policies have
contributed to the sharp rise in automation in China (Cheng et al., 2019). In 2012
and 2013, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of
Science and Technology, both national-level development agencies, published guiding
opinions on promoting automation. In 2014, lower level governments started to offer
financial assistance to companies to automate, generally in the form of a rebate of 10 to
30 percent of the purchase price of qualified equipment, depending on the locality. In
2015, Beijing reaffirmed these provincial- and municipal-level undertakings in its “Made
in China 2025” campaign. Motivated to move China up the innovation value chain,
the plan identified key development industries and promised support for manufacturing
innovation centers.42 A local government official I interviewed quipped that the program
42The full text of the announcement can be found here: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/
2015-05/19/content_9784.htm.
149
had garnered too much negative attention from the United States and Europe,43 and
so officials now simply drop the provoking slogan and prefer to refer to the plan as
“intelligent manufacturing” (zhineng zhizao). Although Premier Li Keqiang did not
refer to the “Made in China 2025” plan in name in his annual address to the National
People’s Congress in March 2019, the policies remained.
The extent to which these policies actually accelerate technological adoption and
innovation remains unclear. On one hand, Cheng et al. (2019) find that firms controlled
by Communist Party members are more likely to adopt industrial robots. Fifteen per-
cent of robot-using firms in their sample reported that government industrial policies
contributed to their adoption decisions. On the other hand, Sharif and Huang (2019b)
note that government officials in Dongguan considered these subsidies merely as “icing
on the cake.” Consistent with their observation, a human resource manager of a multi-
national corporation noted that their company “would have automated anyway” and
that the subsidy amounted to “adding flowers to a brocade” (Company 32, Appendix).
The owner of a privately owned machinery company said they did not apply for the
subsidy to avoid “trouble” and “cumbersome paperwork” (Company 63). The General
Manager of a robotics company complained that state subsidies had hurt innovation and
homegrown robotics development as these financial incentives made once unaffordable
German and Japanese robots attainable for their usual clientele (Company 3).44 More
frequently, firm management attributes automation decisions to market forces — such
as increasing output, responding to competition, and alleviate labor shortages — rather
than government incentives.
Regardless, both government- and market-based motivations to automate will likely
43For example, tariff increases specifically targeted at products identified in the Made In China 2025
plan by the United States.
44Note that some local governments require subsidies to be used on domestically produced robots.
The rule varies across localities.
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persist in the years to come. Figure 22 shows that increases in robot stock in China
preceded government policies to promote “intelligent manufacturing,” but accelerated
in pace in recent years. Does the Chinese government not fear the labor market — and
possibly political — consequences of automation? How does technology affect workers,
and what do workers think about these robots and machines?
Figure 22: Industrial robot stock in China
Data from International Federation of Robotics (2019).
4.3 Data and methods
To answer these questions, I collected a combination of qualitative and quantitative data
in collaboration with two China-based researchers. We secured access to government of-
ficials, firm managers, and production line workers in 19 cities across southern China.
This region has traditionally been a site for policy experimentation and economic innova-
tion. In 2014, the Dongguan Municipal Government in Guangdong Province established
a fund to help companies “replace human with robots.” In addition, the southern region
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houses a significant portion of the country’s manufacturing activities and has thus been
of great economic import to China. Guangdong Province alone was responsible for 26
percent of the country’s total value of exports in 2018.45 Facing increasingly unfavorable
policies (e.g. environmental regulations) and market conditions (e.g. soaring wages) for
low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing, businesses in southern China were also among
the earliest adopters of technology in the nation, making it an instructive case to examine
the effects of automation on Chinese workers (Sharif and Huang, 2019a).
We sought to uncover a comprehensive picture of the impact of automation on work-
ers through a variety of strategies, including interviews, factory visits, and original sur-
veys. We conducted semi-structured interviews with firm managers and production line
workers from 76 manufacturing companies. The list of firms can be found in the Ap-
pendix. For workers, we probed their personal experiences with workplace technology
and possible labor market concerns. For firm managmenet, we inquired about motiva-
tions for and consequences of automation (e.g. profits, recruitment and retention). Over
the course of four months, we also observed production line workers — mostly human,
but sometimes robots — in 34 production facilities. These visits enabled us to contex-
tualize workers’ responses and better understand automation’s on-the-ground impact on
work.
In addition, we fielded two original surveys of over 600 companies and 2,400 workers.
As we had to rely on local Human Resources and Social Security Bureaus for survey
distribution, our sampling method best approximated quota sampling whereby firms
were chosen based on selected characteristics including industry, firm size, and owner-
ship type. The final sample covered eight main industries including chemical, textile and
apparel, electronics, metal fabrication, machinery, automobiles and other transportation
45Data from the National Bureau of Statistics, available at http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/
easyquery.htm?cn=E0103.
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equipment, and beverages and food processing. The firms were a mix of state-owned,
privately-held, foreign-owned, and jointly-owned corporations. Production line workers
were selected from the sampled firms to complete another survey. About 70 percent of
the respondents received some secondary (gaozhong), vocational (zhongzhuan), or tech-
nical education (jixiao), with an average age of 34.46 In addition to enriching descriptive
inference, the two surveys also allowed the subsequent testing of hypotheses that were
updated and refined in the field (Kapiszewski, MacLean and Read, 2015). Admittedly,
China’s political environment introduced significant constraints on sampling and ques-
tion scope, but these interviews and surveys still represent important data on technology
attitudes — especially when getting access to subjects in China has become increasingly
difficult (O’Brien, 2018).
4.4 Workers’ views toward technology
At the beginning of every interview session, we introduced ourselves and were forthright
about the purpose of our visit, which was to “understand the extent of automation at the
production site; and how intelligent manufacturing has affected work, employment, and
labor relations.” The majority of workers were cognizant of technological improvements
at their production sites, if they existed. Many of them underwent training, operated,
maintained, or at least saw these machines. In one case, a fully automated line was
placed directly next to a human line that produced the exact same product (Company
44, Appendix). In our survey of manufacturing workers, about 36 percent of the 2,445
respondents noted that their department had introduced industrial robots. In our sur-
vey of firms, 43 percent reported having acquired new technology aimed at automation.
The discrepancy between the two surveys may be attributable to the fact that we asked
46The median age of the Chinese people is 37.4. The lower average age in the sample is no surprise
as it consisted of only working-age individuals.
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workers about technological improvements in their units, while we asked firm represen-
tatives if there had been such improvements firm-wide. Industrial robots, at the time of
this research, were seldom capable of completing all production procedures from start
to finish, they merely took over certain tasks from humans. Production at most of these
sites was semi-automatic at best.47
When asked to share their experience with technology at work, workers predomi-
nately focused on its practical implications on the factory floor, rather than wage or
employment concerns, contrary to my initial expectations based on extant research
in economics (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014;
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Frey and Osborne, 2017). Among workers who re-
ported experiencing automation, 45 percent noted an improvement in work environment
(whereas 4 percent noted a deterioration). According to our observation, some tech-
nologies must operate in dust-free environments and at machine room temperature with
proper ventilation. These upgrades benefited workers who use or work alongside these
machines — climate-controlled rooms are especially appreciated during long, humid,
and hot southern Chinese summers. In addition, 54 percent and 63 percent of workers
believed technology to have made their jobs less dangerous and less labor intensive re-
spectively (whereas 7 percent and 5 percent reported an increase in injury risks and labor
intensity respectively). During interviews, many workers cited automated guided vehi-
cles (AGVs) including AGV forklifts and AGV pallet jacks as greatly reducing fatigue
and risks of injury, as they were no long required to manually carry heavy articles.
Technology has also been shown to shape the content of jobs, reducing labor input
of routine tasks and increasing labor input of non-routine cognitive tasks (Autor, Levy
47Frey and Osborne (2017) describes such automation bottlenecks. Sometimes, companies choose
not to automate even when they have the appropriate technology. This is more likely to be the case
if the size of an order (usually of an unstandardized or custom product) is not sufficient to justify the
time spent on experimenting and programming.
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and Murnane, 2003). While we did not specifically measure changes in job content
among these workers, 35 percent of those in production units with industrial robots
reported that their jobs became more stimulating due to these technological improve-
ments, and 9 percent reported that work became more monotonous. Over half of them
found technology to have made their jobs neither more interesting nor mundane. A
production line worker in a semiconductor factory (Company 35, Appendix) said, “I
used to have to complete all procedures by hand. I now press the same buttons over
and over again according to the manual, but it is easier.” The ease of operation of
these machines varies widely; in some instances, a mere few days of training sufficed,
in others, it required months-long trips abroad. Additionally, workers on average also
report that technological improvements increased interaction between colleagues as well
as enhanced overall job satisfaction. Figure 23 summarizes workers’ evaluation of au-
tomation’s impact (ranges from 1-3). A higher average rating indicates more positive
evaluation.
As mentioned before, concerns about salary cuts or technological unemployment did
not come up without direct probing during the dozens of interviews conducted, run-
ning counter to expectations derived from relevant macroeconomic research. We asked
workers in the survey if they had been laid off or reassigned to another position due to
technological change in the past two years, only 2 percent said “yes.” Among workers
who witnessed automation in their unit, only 7 percent reported a decrease in salary
(compared to 28 percent who saw an increase). While a survivorship bias was theo-
retically possible — that is, inferences based on survey and interviews of incumbent
workers could potentially overlook workers who were permanently displaced by technol-
ogy — this threat was unlikely to be significant in reality. There appeared to be two
major buffers for wage and employment shocks in the context of southern China at the
time of this research.
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Figure 23: Self-reported impact of automation (mean)
Note: Data from original survey. Rated by workers who reported experiencing automation. Mean
values above the dotted line indicate positive appraisals overall.
Among the sampled firms, there was a continued increase in demand. About 86
percent of these firms service mainly domestic markets. According to World Bank data,
final consumption expenditure in China has risen steadily from 2.9 trillion USD in 2010
to 7.3 trillion USD in 2018.48 Automation helped firms meet larger demands, instead of
leading to mass layoffs. Second, there are chronic labor shortages and retainment issues
in the region (Meng, 2012). About 93 percent of surveyed firms reported facing recruit-
ment challenges and nearly 90 percent reported labor shortages. A human resources
manager (Company 51, Appendix) told a familiar story: “Speaking about City G, there
has been a dramatic decline in labor supply, especially since 2015. The city government
48Accessed on June 29, 2020: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.TOTL.CD
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hosts a manufacturing job fair after the Chinese New Year every year in the sports arena.
The venue used to be packed, but we had half the turnout in 2015, and then just an-
other half of that in 2016.” “I just returned from a month-long recruitment trip in the
Northeast,” he said, noting growing difficulties in recruitment. However, recruitment
was often only half the battle. A majority of firms struggled to retain workers. The
management of a state-owned automotive electronics company (Company 33) lamented
about losing 50 to 60 percent of production workers per year. “It would be better if
we could keep it under 30 percent,” he added. Currently, the pressing challenge facing
Chinese manufacturing in the southern coast is not one of joblessness, but jobs unfilled
due to excessive mobility. About 87 percent of firms in the sample said no workers were
laid off due to automation.
4.5 Anxiety about future automation
However, the absence of massive layoffs does not negate the disappearance of job op-
portunities in the future. Surveyed firms estimated that their firm’s modal industrial
robot could theoretically replace 4.2 workers on average. Instead of laying off workers
and risking labor disputes, interviews revealed that some firms preferred to slow or stop
rehiring after workers resign or complete their contracts. This implies that there may
be fewer open positions industry-wide in the future as Chinese firms continue to auto-
mate. In addition, recent research using Spanish and French data shows that firm-level
automation led to negative market-level employment outcomes, but decreases in employ-
ment occurred not in the automating firm, but chiefly in competitor firms that did not
automate (Koch, Manuylov and Smolka, 2019; Acemoglu, LeLarge and Restrepo, 2020).
Despite Chinese workers’ positive evaluation of automation, they do not appear to be
in denial of the possible future employment effects of automation. About 47 percent of
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workers in the survey believe that their jobs could be automated in the next 5 to 10
years.49
Institutional Effects on Automation Anxiety
Interviews suggest that workers’ level of technological anxiety may vary depending on
what is at stake as well as how easy it is to secure comparable employment after a layoff.
Individuals’ current positions often serve as an anchor point for subsequent evaluations.
Finding a substitute for a good job — stable, well-compensated, with generous fringe
benefits — tends to be more difficult, making an individual more attached to the job
in hand and displacement much more painful. In contrast, labor separations are likely
to be less distressing if the spell of unemployment is short. It is generally much less
challenging to replace a job that provides little, for example, one that lacks a formal
contract, pays low wages, and provides no or limited benefits.
A 60-year-old institutional arrangement in China provides a unique opportunity to
test this theory. The household registration (hukou) system shapes individuals’ lifelong
economic opportunities — and affects how they may be treated as workers — at birth.
Hukou is passed on from one’s parents. It determines an individual’s official and only
formal permanent residence.50 Hundreds of millions of Chinese workers have left their
hometowns for cities in pursuit of economic opportunities, but internal migrants are
shunned from government-provided public services and welfare programs at their migra-
tion destinations, and thus have much higher out-of-pocket expenses and costs of living
(Song, 2014). In addition, migrant workers receive worse treatment in the labor market
than their peers with local hukou. They were 2.6 times more likely than locals to be in-
formally employed in 2005 (Gallagher, Lee and Kuruvilla, 2011). Informal employment
49A similar question found in a Pew Research Center (2016) survey finds that only 18 percent of
Americans believe their occupation will be automated in 50 years.
50Acquiring a local hukou in a big city is possible but notoriously difficult.
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is characterized by its temporality, absence of a formal contact, and limited social in-
surance benefits or labor protections. Moreover, sizable wage differentials exist between
locals and migrants (Lee, 2012). Although the 2008 Labour Contract Law sought to
broaden protections for migrant workers, there are still significant gaps in implementa-
tion, enforcement, and social insurance coverage (Gao, Yang and Li, 2017). In other
words, migrant workers with non-local hukou, on average, receive worse treatments and
lower compensation than their local counterparts even if they perform the same tasks
within the same company.
The systemic differences in access to public services and welfare have an enormous
impact on workers’ daily lives. These push factors decrease migrants’ attachment to
their current jobs, and motivate an increasingly large number of them to return to their
hometowns (Duan et al., 2020). Most workers without a local hukou are not permitted
to send their children to public schools in the city to which they migrated, meaning that
they must either pay for private (and often subpar) education or leave their children
behind in their hometowns. “None of our children [without a local hukou] can attend
[public schools]. They have to go to private schools. The quality of education is infinitely
worse — it is even worse than public schools in my hometown, which costs 47 RMB [7
USD] per year. My child goes to to cheapest private school here and it costs 6,000 RMB
[850 USD] per school term,” a worker from Company 17 (Appendix) said. “Workers
without special skills typically make 5,000 to 6,000 RMB per month in this firm and
the minimum wage in the city is 2,200 RMB,” she added. Moreover, other costs of
living in cities also typically increase at a much faster pace than wages. The starting
monthly salary for another interviewee’s position grew 50 percent from 3,000 RMB in
2008 to 4,500 RMB in 2018, but housing costs doubled during the same period of time
(Company 51, Appendix). To offset these costs, locals can apply for minimum living
standard subsidies and subsidized housing, but non-local workers cannot (Feng, Hu and
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Moffitt, 2017).
Migrant workers have lower expectations. Their disadvantaged positions also mean
that exit options no worse than their status quo are relatively abundant in supply. In-
terviewees frequently talked about options such as insurance sales, realtor, ride-share
driver, and food delivery.51 Migrant workers are also more likely to be be geographically
mobile than locals. Given the plethora of imminent threats to employment and family
well-being, technological displacement is also not among migrant workers’ top concerns.
Furthermore, the greater legal protection afforded to local workers ironically makes them
more expensive to hire and therefore less competitive than non-local workers with the
same skills. For example, in Shenzhen, employers are mandated to provide medical in-
surance for contracted employees. They are required to purchase Tier 1 insurance for
local employees and contribute 6 percent of the workers’ salary toward the premium. On
the other hand, employers are allowed to purchase Tier 2 or Tier 3 insurance for work-
ers without a local hukou, costing them only 0.5 percent or 0.4 percent of the worker’s
monthly salary respectively.52 Given their higher wages and government-mandated ben-
efits, local workers are overall a greater financial burden to their employers than migrant
workers. Thus, not only do local workers have more to lose, they are less mobile and
might have a harder time securing a job after displacement, making them more anxious
about job automation. Figure 24 below summarizes the argument:
Empirical test
I test the theory using an original survey fielded in 19 southern cities. The sampling
procedures were previously discussed in section 3. All 2,443 respondents are production
51Interviewees noted that the younger generation often prefer real estate and insurance sales jobs
over factory jobs. Other flexible employment opportunities in the gig economy were rumored to be
higher-paying than unskilled manufacturing jobs among workers I conversed with.
52The full text of the Shenzhen Social Medical Insurance Law can be found here: http://sso.sz.
gov.cn/pub/sbjmeta/zxbs/zdyw/cbyw/zcwj/201408/t20140830_2553100.htm.
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Figure 24: Institutional effects on automation anxiety
workers in manufacturing. The sample is 50 percent male. The average respondent is
34 years of age, had attended either high school, vocational school, or technical school,
and has a local hukou. They work in a large variety of industries, with electronics and
electrical appliances (23 percent), clothing and textile (15 percent), and machinery and
equipments (8 percent) best represented in the sample.
The dependent variable is the level of automation anxiety felt by workers. The survey
asked respondents, “If your firm adopts industrial robots or automates production, how
worried are you about losing your job?” Answers range from “not at all worried” to “very
worried.” The independent variable is an individuals’ hukou status — local or non-local.
The model also includes a host of individual-level demographic and attitudinal covariates
that may influence technological anxiety. I control for age, gender, and the number of
years an individual has served in their current firm (as a proxy of job stability). I also
control for education, which may be correlated with individuals’ ability to adapt to and
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benefit from workplace technology (Gallego, Kurer and Scho¨ll, 2018) and how susceptible
they are to automation (Frey and Osborne, 2017). In addition, the model accounts for
respondents’ self-assessed risk of replacement by robots and any existing plans to leave
the firm. Lastly, I control for firm ownership (privately-owned, foreign-owned, state-
owned), firm size (as measured by the amount of registered capital), firm-level profit
margin, and industry type (e.g. clothing and textiles, food and beverage).
Results
Results are presented in Table 20. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm cluster-
ing. Respondents with a non-local hukou are less likely to be worried about technological
displacement, with (column 3) and without firm-level controls (column 1). Hukou’s sta-
tistically significant effect on technological anxiety is consistent with the predictions of
the theory. This effect is substantively modest, but its role is comparable to a common
explanation of automation susceptibility — education. The additional achievement of
an educational milestone reduces individuals’ technological anxiety by roughly the same
magnitude as having a non-local hukou. Moreover, workers are less worried about being
displaced by robots the longer they have served in the company, affording them seniority
and feelings of security. Unsurprisingly, self-assessed risk of job automation in the next
5 to 10 years is positively associated with technological anxiety. However, age, gender,
and workers’ existing plans have no impact on technological anxiety, contrary to some
of the findings in Giuntella and Wang (2019). Results are consistent across models with
only individual-level covariates (column 1) and the full specification (column 3).
Firm- and industry-level covariates, as presented in column 2, appear to be less
reliable predictors of automation anxiety than individual-level predictors. Only firm size
has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. Workers in larger firms,
as measured by the firm’s registered capital, report higher levels of automation anxiety.
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Table 20: Predictors of technological anxiety
(1) Individual (2) Firm (3) Full
Non-local −0.10∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Education −0.11∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Gender −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Age −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Firm years −0.01∗ −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Automation risk 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Plan to leave 0.10 0.09
(0.05) (0.06)
Ownership: Private −0.00 −0.07
(0.11) (0.11)
Ownership: Foreign 0.03 −0.06
(0.11) (0.12)
Firm size 0.19∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Profit margin −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Industry: Electronics 0.09 0.11
(0.08) (0.08)
Industry: Machinery −0.01 0.06
(0.09) (0.09)
Industry: Plastics 0.01 0.08
(0.10) (0.10)
Industry: Metalworking 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.11)
Industry: Furniture −0.04 −0.04
(0.10) (0.11)
Industry: Automobile 0.12 0.17
(0.12) (0.12)
Industry: Food −0.10 −0.13
(0.13) (0.11)
Industry: Others 0.06 0.11
(0.08) (0.08)
Constant 2.25∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.18)
Observations 1940 2107 1803
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Large firms have more resources are are thus in better positions to adopt state-of-the-art
technology than small firms, contributing to the higher anxiety levels of their employees.
However, the profit margin of a firm has small and statistically insignificant effects on
job anxiety. In addition, workers in privately-owned and foreign-owned companies are
no more or less worried about being replaced by robots than workers in state-owned
enterprises, the baseline category, even though state-owned enterprises are less likely to
automate (Cheng et al., 2019). Various industry types, compared to the clothing and
textiles industry baseline, appears to have no effect on anxiety. This is in line with
expectations based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Frey and Osborne (2017), which
argue for a task-based approach rather than industry-based approach to understand
automation susceptibility.
On the whole, these results are consistent with the proposed theory and support
findings from semi-structured interviews conducted in the field. Paradoxically, insofar
as Chinese manufacturing workers experience anxiety over prospective job automation,
local workers — who are better compensated and protected by local labor regulations —
are more worried about technological displacement than migrant workers with non-local
hukou.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper presented qualitative and quantitative accounts of Chinese manufacturing
workers’ reception of workplace automation based on semi-structured interviews, factory
visits, and two original surveys conducted in 19 cities. Contrary to the scholarship’s more
pessimistic accounts of automation, most manufacturing workers in southern China —
buffered by steady increases in demand and chronic labor shortages — appear to be
unconcerned about technology’s impact on employment and wages at present. During
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interviews, workers instead emphasized the immediate and observable effects of techno-
logical improvements, such as lowered risks of injury, less monotonous work, lower labor
intensity, increased competitiveness, and improved work environments, as opposed to
economic or material concerns. These on-the-ground benefits of technological improve-
ments play an important role in influencing blue-collar workers’ attitudes toward tech-
nology, but they are often overlooked in macroeconomic analyses and popular discourses
on workplace automation.
Chinese manufacturing workers do not appear to be in denial of the possible future
employment effects of automation. About half of the surveyed workers believe that
their jobs could be automated within the decade, whereas only 18 percent of Americans
believe their occupation would be automated in 50 years (Pew Research Center, 2016).
Survey results find that local workers are more worried about technological displacement
than workers with non-local hukou, controlling for a host of individual- and firm-level
covariates. This paper argues that China’s hukou system shapes individuals’ economic
opportunities, and thus influences their expectations, what is at stake, and the avail-
ability of exit options no worse than the status quo. A good job with generous fringe
benefits and protection is, on average, much harder to replace than a job that provides
little to begin with. The undesirability of migrants’ circumstances — precarious posi-
tions, lower renumeration, out-of-pocket expenses for essential public services that they
are ineligible for, and sometimes years-long separation from their children — lower their
expectations, and make their jobs less painful to lose and easier to substitute. Immi-
grant workers face a plethora of imminent threats to employment and family well-being,
pushing technological displacement down their lists of concerns.
This paper contributes to ongoing discussions in Chinese politics, labor politics,
and comparative political economy. For researchers interested in Chinese politics, this
work highlights the unintended labor consequences of an unequal welfare system which
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discriminates people based the hukou status people inherited at birth. By allowing
systemic inequalities to persist (e.g. permitting employers to opt for a lesser tier of
social insurance for their non-local employees), local governments inadvertently hurt the
competitiveness of the group they sought to protect. In addition, this project also reveals
a possible tension between local governments’ goal of facilitating industrial upgrading
through incentivizing automation on one hand, and placating their local working class
constituents on the other. If local workers continue to feel more negatively affected
by automation, local governments’ aggressive push to modernize factories and promote
“smart manufacturing” may create dissatisfaction amongst a group of constituents that
is no stranger to contentious collective action.
This paper offers an institutional explanation of automation anxiety that may have
implications beyond China. While existing explanations of education and job character-
istics are no doubt relevant to the analyses of technology attitudes, this paper shows how
institutions — existing labor arrangements — can lead to different levels of technological
receptiveness for people who face similar threats of automation. In other countries, ex-
isting structures of labor organization often affect the value of the job at stake, especially
for workers with lower educational attainment. In these situations, antagonism toward
technology may be more likely to originate from organized groups, although it is not yet
clear how automation may fundamentally shift the balance of capital-labor bargaining.
If technological improvements are considered necessary to enhance economic growth and
a nation’s competitiveness, it is critical to understand the origins of technological anxiety
and devise appropriate remedies to address these apprehensions.
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4.7 Appendix
List of interviews and company visits
Industry (name concealed to protect identities), city shorthand, establishment year,
ownership type, size (employment), date (MM/DD/YY) (∗asterisk denotes additional
factory or company visits). These interviews were conducted with Zhongwei Sun (South
China Normal University) and Yunxue Deng (Central South University) in 2018. Inter-
viewees included company leadership, human resources managers, and production line
workers.
1. Automotive, City A, 2005, Japanese, 700, 09/13/18∗
2. Pharmaceutical, City A, 1959, State-owned, 1,200, 09/13/18∗
3. Robotics/Machinery, City A, 2015, State-owned, 1,000, 09/14/18∗
4. Chemical engineering, City A, 1985, Privately-owned, 200, 08/22/18
5. Chemical engineering (household), City A, 1994, Privately-owned, 10,000, 08/22/18
6. Product packaging, City A, 2001, Hong Kong, 500, 08/22/18
7. Furniture, City A, 1994, Privately-owned, 1,000, 08/22/18
8. Electronics, City A, 1999, Privately-owned, 900, 08/22/18
9. Automotive, City A, 2003, Joint venture, 16,000, 08/22/18
10. Automotive, City A, 1992, Joint venture, 3,800, 08/22/18
11. Computing/electronics, City B, 1993, Privately-owned, 1,000, 09/06/18∗
12. Semiconductor, City B, 1984, Joint venture, 600, 09/05/18∗
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13. Jewelry, City B, 2012, Hong Kong, 600, 09/07/18∗
14. Electronics, City B, 2003, Privately-owned, 200, 09/07/18∗
15. Electronics, City B, 2002, Privately-owned, 1,200, 09/07/18∗
16. Automotive, City B, 1995, Privately-owned, 1,200, 09/07/18∗
17. Robotics/Machinery, City B, 2012, Privately-owned, 110, 09/06/18
18. Electronics, City B, 2000, American, 1,800, 09/06/18
19. Jewelry, City B, 2007, Privately-owned, 230, 09/06/18
20. Electrical appliances, City B, 1991, Republic of China (Taiwan), 3,500, 09/05/18
21. Electronics, City B, 1994, Hong Kong, 2,000, 09/05/18
22. Machinery, City B, 1986, Joint venture, 1,000, 08/24/18∗
23. Electronics, City B, 2008, Privately-owned, 2,000, 08/23/18∗
24. Pharmaceutical, City B, 1979, Privately-owned, 3,000, 08/23/18
25. Office facilities, City B, 2001, Japanese, 1,000, 08/23/18
26. Electronics, City C, 2010, Privately-owned, 7,000, 08/23/18
27. Automotive parts, City C, 1998, Republic of China (Taiwan), 1,000, 08/23/18
28. Electrical appliances, City C, 2010, Hong Kong, 2,000, 08/23/18
29. Metalworking, City C, 2010, Hong Kong, 1,000, 08/23/18
30. Polymer/plastics, City C, 2012, Republic of China (Taiwan), 800, 08/23/18
31. Electronics and Electrical appliances, City D, 1994, Privately-owned, 6,600, 09/10/18∗
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32. Beverages, City D, 2006, British/Hong Kong, 280, 09/11/2018∗
33. Automotive electronics, City D, 1986, State-owned, 4,300, 09/11/18∗
34. Automotive parts, City D, 1995, Japanese, 5,000, 09/12/18∗
35. Machinery, City D, 2010, Hong Kong, 1,800, 09/12/18∗
36. Automotive parts, City D, 1992, Japanese, 1,500, 09/10/18
37. Electrical appliances, City E, 1983, Joint venture, 1,500, 10/15/18∗
38. Electronics, City E, 1997, Privately-owned, 1,300, 10/15/18∗
39. Textiles, City E, 2004, 500, Privately-owned, 500, 10/15/18
40. Ceramics, City E, 2002, 750, Privately-owned, 750, 10/15/18
41. Electrical appliances, City E, 2011, Privately-owned, 730, 10/15/18
42. Automotive electronics, City E, 1981, Privately-owned, 2,500, 10/15/18
43. Furniture, City E, 2015, Privately-owned, 320, 10/17/18
44. Electrical appliances, City F, 1992, Privately-owned, 2,600, 10/17/18∗
45. Lighting, City F, 1997, Privately-owned, 9,000, 10/18/18∗
46. Automotive parts, City F, 2002, Japanese, 1,000, 10/16/18
47. Robotics/machinery, City F, 2003, Privately-owned, 150, 10/16/18
48. Industrial production (bathrooms), 2008, American, 210, 10/16/18
49. Pharmaceuticals, City F, 2002, Privately-owned, 600, 10/16/18
50. Packaging and printing, City F, 1900, Privately-owned, 1,600, 10/16/18
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51. Robotics/machinery, City G, 2015, Privately-owned, 1,100, 10/18/18∗
52. Machinery/motor, City G, 2003, Japanese, 2,400, 10/18/18
53. Automotive, City G, 2008, Privately-owned, 10,000, 10/18/18
54. Machinery, City H, Privately-owned, 350, 10/08/18
55. Packaging, City H, Privately-owned, 490, 10/09/18∗
56. Toys, City H, Privately-owned, 500, 10/09/18∗
57. Electrical appliances, City H, Privately-owned, 400, 10/08/18
58. Toys, City H, Hong Kong, 430, 10/08/18
59. Metalworking, City H, 1996, Hong Kong, 300, 10/09/18∗
60. Stationery, City H, 1998, Privately-owned, 200, 10/08/18
61. Moulding/machinery, City I, 2000, Privately-owned, 1,000, 10/11/18∗
62. Moulding/machinery, City I, 1958, Privately-owned, 300, 10/11/18∗
63. Moulding/machinery, City I, 1992, Privately-owned, 60, 10/11/18∗
64. Furniture, City I, 2008, Privately-owned, 100, 10/12/18∗
65. Shoes, City I, 2000, Privately-owned, 600, 10/12/18∗
66. Electronics, City J, 2009, Privately-owned, 2,200, 11/21/18∗
67. Machinery, City J, 1992, Privately-owned, 600, 11/21/18
68. Machinery/Parts, City J, 1966, State-owned, 500, 11/21/18
69. Beverages, City J, 2016, Privately-owned, 160, 11/21/18∗
170
70. Machinery, City J, 1992, Joint venture, 200, 11/21/18∗
71. Steel and metal, City K, 2008, State-owned, 2,900, 11/22/18∗
72. Metalworking, City K, 1995, Privately-owned, 600, 11/22/18∗
73. Metalworking, City K, 2010, Privately-owned, 300, 11/22/18
74. Knife making, City K, 1997, Privately-owned, 200, 11/22/18
75. Glassworking, City K, 1994, Privately-owned, 300, 11/22/18
76. Electrical appliances, City K, 2004, German, 900, 11/22/18
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Survey samples
Table 21: Survey: firm sample (by ownership)
Ownership N % Cumulative
State-owned 24 3.95 3.95
Privately-owned 313 51.48 55.43
Hong Kong 121 19.90 75.33
Taiwan 48 7.89 83.22
Japan 26 4.28 87.50
Korea 2 0.33 87.83
Europe and United States 24 3.95 91.78
Others 50 8.22 100.00
Total 608 100.00
Table 22: Survey: firm sample (by industry)
Industry N % Cumulative
Electronics and electrical appliances 153 25.16 25.16
Machinery 59 9.70 34.87
Plastics and chemicals 71 11.68 46.55
Textile and clothing 102 16.78 63.32
Metalworking 44 7.24 70.56
Appliances, toys, furniture 58 9.54 80.10
Automobile 26 4.28 84.38
Food and beverages 35 5.76 90.13
Others 4 0.66 90.79
Metallurgy and cement processing 38 6.25 97.04
Vehicle parts 10 1.64 98.68
Paper 8 1.32 100.00
Total 608 100.00
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Table 23: Survey: firm sample (by size)
Size (employees) N % Cumulative
Small (1-299) 291 47.86 47.86
Mid-sized (300-999) 192 31.58 79.44
Large (1000 or above) 125 20.56 100.00
Total 608 100.00
Table 24: Survey: worker sample (by gender)
Gender N % Cumulative
Male 1,209 49.67 49.67
Female 1,225 50.33 100.00
Total 2,434 100.00
Table 25: Survey: worker sample (by age)
Age (compressed) N % Cumulative
15-25 332 13.66 13.66
25-30 618 25.42 39.08
31-35 580 23.86 62.94
36-40 463 19.05 81.98
41 or above 438 18.02 100.00
Total 2,431 100.00
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Table 26: Survey: worker survey (by educational attainment)
Education N % Cumulative
Elementary school or below 66 2.70 2.70
Middle school 670 27.40 30.10
High school, tech school, vocational school 980 40.08 70.18
Associate degree 494 20.20 90.39
Bachelor’s degree or above 235 9.61 100.00
Total 2,445 100.00
Table 27: Survey: worker survey (by household registration/hukou)
Hukou N % Cumulative
Local, agriculture 696 29.27 29.27
Local, non-agriculture 514 21.61 50.88
Non-local, agriculture 969 40.75 91.63
Non-local, non-agriculture 199 8.37 100.00
Total 2,378 100.00
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of arguments
While decades of studies in economics have documented the distributional consequences
of technology related to employment, income, inequality, and health, the political effects
of automation are not well understood. This dissertation represents one of the first
systematic attempts to study public opinion toward automation, making three main
arguments:
First, despite technology’s disruptions to the labor market, people have largely pos-
itive attitudes toward workplace technology. Technology has immediate and observable
benefits on workers’ day-to-day experiences that are generally not captured in macroeco-
nomic analyses of technological change. Most workers also believe that technological in-
novation and adoption are crucial to ensure their company’s survival and in maintaining
their country’s competitiveness in the world. These favorable appraisals of technology
coexist with widespread concerns about technological displacement, and remain rela-
tively robust even when people are explicitly reminded of technology’s labor-displacing
effects.
Second, it shows that workers cope with employment threats from automation, not
by slowing technology adoption and innovation, but instead by clamoring for restrictions
175
against immigrants and foreign workers. Employment anxiety from automation evokes
individuals’ protectionist instincts. With robots eating into the pie of jobs, people want
to stop outsiders from further dividing the pie. Hesitant to halt innovation, individuals
would rather buffer domestic workers facing technological threat with substitute policies
— restrictions on immigration and trade — that they believe could improve national
wages and employment prospects. Thus, the threat of automation has not ignited a
backlash against technology, but a populist revolt against globalization.
Lastly, this work argues that institutions influence workers’ evaluation of techno-
logical threat. Rules governing labor relations and organizations affect workers’ expec-
tations, grounds for termination, and the ease of securing comparable employment in
case of dismissal. The household registration system in China creates a stratified labor
market for local and non-local workers. Non-local workers, who face systemic discrimi-
nation and have fewer labor protections, are ironically less concerned about technological
displacement than local workers. The availability of exit options no worse than their
status quo contributes to migrants’ lower anxiety about automation compared to locals.
Antagonism toward technology may be more likely to originate from workers in rela-
tively privileged positions, if they do not expect to be able to transition to comparable
employment after a layoff.
5.2 Future research
Throughout history, when labor-replacing technology threatened workers, resistance was
the norm rather than the exception. While this work finds a widespread disdain for
government restrictions on technology, it does not rule out resistance to automation
that may erupt in other forms or within subpopulations in the future. Future public
opinion studies aiming to understand the politics of automation may consider further
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exploring different dimensions of technology policies. Proposals such as rolling back
existing tax incentives designed to promote automation (in the case of South Korea)
and taxing robots as if they were humans (as proposed by business leaders like Bill
Gates) may gain traction amongst the public. This dissertation has only examined one
generic form of anti-technology policy.
In addition, it may be fruitful to examine the conditions in which enthusiasm to-
ward technology might break down within subpopulations. The paradoxical finding in
China that non-local workers with less labor protections (leading to lower expectations
and more exit options) exhibit lower levels of automation anxiety than local workers
merits further examination in other contexts. Institutional mechanisms in other sys-
tems likewise create marked differences in compensation and stratification in the labor
market, even for workers with similar skills, such as union and non-union workers in the
United States, and full-time and part-time workers in Japan. Findings from this dis-
sertation imply that opposition to automation may come from workers with relatively
privileged positions. Furthermore, variations in industrial relations and vocational train-
ing between liberal market economies (e.g. the United States) and coordinated market
economies (e.g. Germany) may contribute to differences in technological acceptance
among workers. A promising area for future research may be how different “varieties
of capitalism” affect the pace of technological adoption, anti-technology mobilization
efforts within a network, transferability of workers’ skills, and the availability of exit
options system-wide.
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